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MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY
PROJECT Y
THE LOS ALAMOS PROJECT
LAMS-2532 (Vol. I)
SPECLAL DISTRIBUTION
LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ALAMOS NEW MEXICO
REPORT WRITTEN: 1946and 1947
REPORT DISTRIBUTED: December 1, 1961
MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY
PR~ECT Y
THE LOS ALAMOS PROJECT
VOL. I. INCEPTION UNTIL AUGUST 1945
by
David Hawkins
VOL. II. AUGUST 1945 THROUGH DECEMBER 1946
by Edith C. Truslow
and
Ralph Carlisle Smith
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)
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.
.
This LAMS report has been prepared because of the demand for and interest
in the historical information. The two volumes have not been edited except
for classification purposes nor verified for accuracy. All LAMSreports
express the views of the authors as of the time they were written and do
not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Los Alamos Scientiilo Laboratory
or the final opinion of the authors on the subject.
ABSTRACT
These two volumes constitute a record of the technical, administrative,
and policy-making activities of the Los Alamos Project (Project Y) from its
inception
under the Manhattan District through the development of the atomic
bomb (Vol. I), and during the period following the end of World War II until
the Manhattan District relinquished control to the Atomic Energy Commission
as of January 1947 (Vol. II).
Although security regulations have required some deletions in the original
text of the two volumes, every effort has been made to retain the original
language and expressions of the authors.
.
Editors note: The name Los Alamos Laboratory was in use
during the period covered by these volumes. In September
1945 the name of the contracting University of California could
be made known. The present name, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
of the University of California, was adopted in January
1947.
PREFACE
Project Y, the Los Alamos Project, has been one of a group of organizations
known collectively as the Development of Substitute Materials project,
(DSM), devoted to the wartime development of the atomic bomb. This branch
of the DSM organization was created early in the year 1943. During the
period of its existence it has been the center of activities connected with
bomb development and production, as distinguished from the development and
production of nuclear explosive materials.
The history of all DSM activities possesses a peculiar interest and im
portance, not only because of the remarkable achievements and potentialities
of nuclear technology, but also because of the wartime character and motivation
of its initial development. Because of its large social cost, a scrupulous
accounting of the entire venture is required. Project Y has been, of
itself, small compared to the other DSM projects. It has, however, occupied
a crucial position. The wartime success of the entire undertaking has depended
upon its success.
The nature of the present chronicle of Los Alamos is thus determined
by the requirement that there exist a careful accounting of its technical, administrative,
and policy-making activities. This document is a record, not
an interpretation of events. Within the limitations thus implied, however, it
has not been forgotten that the events recorded have taken place within a
wider context, the evolution of organized scientific research and of world
technology. The problems of organization and policy that lie here, sharpened
by the advent of control over nuclear energies, will call for the most searching
interpretation and analysis. It is hoped that in this record of fact nothing
has been omitted or slighted that may be of interest to those who seek light
upon questions still to be answered.
Another limitation is inherent in the nature of an official record. This
is the necessary omission of many subjective factors. The success of so
complex and uncertain a venture as Los Alamos depends upon its ability to
extend knowledge of the explicit and publicly accountable sort at which
science aims. But this ability depends, in turn, upon an accumulation of experience
and skill in technical and human affairs inseparably connected with
.
vii
the qualities, and even the vagaries, of personality. What appears in retrospect
as a natural unfolding of possibilities acquired this appearance only
through the interaction and on occasion the clash of opinion, in an atmosphere
dominated by the problematic and the uncertain. The omission is inevitable
in an account which must itself be based upon objective evidence.
It is, however, proper to state here the writer!s belief that these necessary
omissions do not seriously distort the picture, as they would if important
occurrences and tendencies were not objectively justified. That the
pattern of development is so largely a rational one is a tribute to the unity
of purpose of all concerned: administrators and scientists, civilian and military.
A large share of the credit that this has been so must be given to the
Director, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, not only for his general leadership,
but also more specifically because he understood the necessity for unity and
sought in every way to foster it.
The reader will observe from the table of contents that the history of
Los Alamos, Vol. I, has been divided into two periods, the first extending
to August 1944, and the second from August 1944 to August 1945. This divi-,
sion does not correspond to any major break in the continuity of the Laboratory?
s work, although it does come at the time of an extensive administration
reorganization. The real purpose of this division is to permit some
chance to summarize and connect activities which, although constantly interrelated
in practice, must be written about in separate chapters. And although
no distinct separation into phases is possible, the date chosen marks as well
as any the transition at Los Alamos from research to development, from
schematization to engineering.
At this place I wish to acknowledge the assistance I have received
from many members of the Los Alamos Laboratory. In particular I wish to
thank the following: J. A. Ackerman, S. K. Allison, E. Anderson, K. T. Bainbridge,
C. L. Critchfield, Priscilla Duffield, A. C. Graves, Elizabeth R.
Graves, L. H. Hempelmann, A. U. Henshey, H. I. Miller, Emily Morrison,
Philip Morrison, N. H. Ramsey, Frederick Reines, Ralph Carlisle Smith, and
R. F. Taschek. These persons have materially helped me in gathering data, in
drafting various sections of the report, or in extensive criticism of earlier drafts.
I wish especially to thank Emily Morrison and Priscilla Duffield for ingenious
researches in the records of an organization that was frequently too busy to
be concerned with posterity. Mrs. Morrison has prepared the graphical
material, has drafted several of the chapters, and has given invaluable general
assistance. Finally it must be made clear that all errors of fact in
this record are the sole responsibility of the author'.
David Hawkins
August 6, 1946
REASONS FOR NEW PROJECT
1.1 During the early period of the DSM project, the most urgent requirement
was the large scale production of nuclear explosives. There could
be no atomic bomb without usable amounts of fissionable materials. Both the
separation of U236and the production of PU239presented major scientific and
industrial problems. Until these problems were on their way to solution,
there was little need or time for detailed theoretical or experimental work
on the mechanism of the nuclear explosion. This work had in fact not progressed
very far beyond what was needed to show the probable feasibility
and effectiveness of the fission bomb as a weapon for the present war. By
the middle of 1942, however, it had become clear that the scientific and
engineering problems connected with the development of such a weapon and
its use in combat called for early and intensive effort. At this time over-all
responsibility for the physics of bomb development had been given to the
Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago. This organization was
geared, however, to its own problems, and in particular to the development
of the slow neutron chain reaction as a source of plutonium. Work on fast
neutron chain reactions, looking toward bomb development, was going on, but
largely under various subcontractors of the Metallurgical Laboratory.
1.2 The first step toward a more concerted program of bomb development
was the appointment, in June 1942, of J. Robert Oppenheimer from the
University of California as Director of the work. Although associated with
the Metallurgical Laboratory, Oppenheimer carried on his work at the University
of California with a small group of theoretical physicists. In his
coordination of the experimental work on fast neutron physics, he was assisted
by J. H. Manley of the Metallurgical Laboratory, and later by E. M.
McMillan, who joined his group in Berkeley.
Late in June, a conference was called in Berkeley to discuss the
theory of the bomb and plan work for the future. Present at this conference
were Oppenheimer, J. H. Van Vleck, R. Serber, E. Teller, E. J. Konopinski,
S. P. Frankel, H. A. Bethe, E. C. Nelson, F. Bloch. A considerable part of
the discussion was devoted to a new type of explosive reaction that had been
considered by Teller, a thermonuclear reaction in deuterium (1.46). There
was some discussion of the theory of the shock waves produced in the chain
reaction explosion, on the basis of work that had been done by Bethe and
Van Vleck. Another topic was the damage to be expected in terms of energy
release. This was discus sed largely in a qualitative way, by scaling up from
small explosions and by comparison with such disasters as the Halifax explosion.
At this conference, there was a thorough review of theoretical and
experimental work that had been done. By this time enough information was
available so that there were no large gaps in the picture. Rough but qualitatively
reliable data were available from work that had been done under
Metallurgical Laboratory contracts ; a good deal of relevant information had
been obtained from British sources, from work done by Peierls, Fuchs,
Davison, and Dirac. British theoretical results were also available. Although
a fair part of the discussion at the conference was not along what
subsequently turned out to be the main line of development, it served to
clarify basic ideas and define basic problems. It also served to make clear
that the development of the fission bomb would require a major scientific
and technical effort.
1.4 Following the summer conference in Berkeley, there were a number
of conferences in Chicago with experimentalists. At this time a number
of subcontracts had already been let by the University of Chicago, for the
purpose of pursuing the investigation of nuclear properties relevant to bomb
designs. A loose organization was formed, including the subprojects at Rice
Institute, The Department of Terrestrial Magnetism of the Carnegie Institution
of Washington, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Minnesota,
Purdue University, Stanford University, Cornell University, the University of
Chicago, and the University of California.
1.5 By October of 1942, it had been decided that the magnitude of the
difficulties involved made necessary the formation of a new project. Even
the initial work of providing nuclear specifications for the bomb was seriously
hampered by the lack of an organization united in one locality; it was clear
that without such an organization the ordnance work would be impossible.
LOCATION
1.6 The site of Project Y was selected in November 1942. It was the
Los Alamos Ranch School, located on an isolated mesa in the Pajarito Plateau,
by highway about 40 miles north and west of Santa Fe, New Mexico.
The reasons for the selection of such a site are of some interest and throw
light on the character of the new project. First, there would be need of a
large proving ground, with a climate suitable for outdoor work in winter.
Second, the site would have to be remote from both seacoasts and the possibility
-at that time not negligible -of attack. Locations might ~ve. been
found which satisfied these requirements but were more accessible. The inaccessibility
of Los Alamos, however, would not create serious problems
for a small project such as this was intended to be. Its subsequent growth
to many times its original size was not foreseen. In the light of the military
security policy which prevailed at the time, inaccessibility was a deciding
factor in favor of this location.
1.7 During the year 1942, steps were taken to transfer the entire DSM
project from the auspices of the Office of Scientific Research and Development
(OSRD) to that of the Manhattan District. The highest degree of secrecy
had to be maintained throughout the entire program; the new subproject,
moreover, was to be its most secret part. The need for an unusual degree
of isolation was supported by two considerations. The first was inaccessibility
from the outside. From this standpoint the location chosen was excellent.
Access from the direction of populated areas is made difficult, except
along certain roads and canyons, by a line of cliffs that mark the eastern
edge of the Paj arit o Plateau. The second consideration was the geographically
enforced isolation of project personnel, which would minimize the
possibilityy that secret information might diffuse outward through social and
professional channels.
1.8 The choice of a site, determined by the considerations suggested
above, was not the responsibility of the project director or his staff. Their
views, neverthelesss, had a bearing on the selection and served to strengthen
in the minds of the military authorities the arguments for isolation. The
task that confronted the project was not one of development and engineering
in the ordinary sense. It was one of intensive and highly organized research
in a region that had been only schematically explored. It required collaboration
of physicists, chemists, metallurgists, and engineers in solving difficult
problems, many of which could not even be anticipated until the work was
well under way. The need for collaboration was made emphatic by the imposition
of a definite time-scale: the bomb had to be ready for production
by the time usable quantities of nuclear explosive became available. To
carry out such a program successfully would require the highest kind of
integration and therefore of decentralization and mutual confidence. To this
end, free communication within the laboratory was indispensable.
1.9 In contrast with the requirements of scientific organization, as .
felt and stated by the scientific staff members, the normal military procedure
for protecting secret information is one of subdivision. Each individual or
working unit has access only to information immediately relevant to the work
being pursued. This conflict of scientific and military requirements is, of
course, not peculiar to nuclear research. "Many members of the potential
scientific staff were, or had been, engaged in other war research, and were
from previous experience convinced of the evils of obstructing the normal
flow of information within a laboratory. They were vigorously opposed to
compartmentalization. Clearly, however, no alternative was acceptable which
did not in some way satisfy the security requirements of the military authorities.
Evidently these requirements could be met by allowing internal
freedom and imposing instead more severe external restrictions than might
otherwise appear necessary. The adoption of such a policy made necessary
the choice of an isolated location for the project.
ORGANIZATION
1.10 The Los Alamos site, together with a large surrounding area,
was established as a military reservation. The community, fenced and
guarded, was made an army post. The laboratory, in turn, was built within
an inner fenced and guarded area, called the ?lTechnical Area. ~? Both the
military and technical administrations were responsible to Major General
L. R. Groves, who had over-all executive responsibility for the work. The
Commanding Officer reported directly to General Groves; he was responsible
for the conduct of military personnel, the maintenance of adequate living
conditions, prevention of trespass, and special guarding. Oppenheimer, as
Scientific Director, was also responsible to General Groves, who had as his
technical adviser J. B. Conant. In addition to his technical responsibilities,
the Director was made responsible for the policy and administration of security.
This provision represented a guarantee that there would be no military
control of the exchange of information among scientific staff members,
and at the same time fixed responsibility y for the maintenance of security
under these conditions. In carrying out his responsibilities for security, the
Director was to be given the assistance and advice of a Military Intelligence
Officer.
1.11 The financial and procurement operations of Project Y were
handled by the University of California as prime contractor. During the
early period of operations, when these had largely to do with the employment
of personnel and establishing a procurement office, the University acted
under a letter of intent from the OSRD, effective as of January 1, 1943.
This letter was in turn superseded by a formal contract, W7405-ENG-36,
effective April 20, 1943, with the Manhattan Engineer District of the War
Department. The contract was retroactive to January 1, 1943. This contract,
with subsequent supplemental agreements, has been the formal basis
of the Project's operation throughout the rest of its history.
1.12 The financial operations of the University of California at Los
Alamos were provided for by the appointment of a resident Business Officer,
J. A. D. Muncy. The procurement of materials was arranged through a dual
organization. In addition to the procurement division of the project, the
University established in Los Angeles a special purchasing office. This arrangement
was dictated primarily by reasons of security. It might be possible
to determine both the nature and progress of the work from a knowledge
of the nature and volume of its procurement operations. According to
the procedure established, goods ordered through the Los Angeles office were
received there and transshipped to Los Alamos. The procurement offices at
the site were placed under the direction of D. P. Mitchell. Mitchell had for
many years been in charge of laboratory procurement for the Physics Department
of Columbia University, and most recently for a National Defense
Research Council (NDRC) project at that University.
1.13 A statement of the responsibilities of the military and contractor
organizations, and a directive outlining the scope and purpose of Project Y,
were set forth in a letter to Oppenheimer dated February 25, 1943, from
General Groves and Conant (Appendix 1). This letter contains also a statement
of intention concerning the future organization of the project. According
to this statement it was anticipated that the Project would remain an
organization of the OSRD type during the first period of its operation, when
it would be engaged mainly in nuclear research. During a later period of
operation, when the project would be involved in the dangerous work of bomb
development and assembly, it would be conducted on a military basis, with
opportunity for its civilian staff members to be commissioned as officers.
This anticipated reorganization proved unnecessary. Difficulties that had
been expected with the initial form of organization did not in fact appear,
and the plan was dropped.
.
-5
INITIAL PERSONNEL, MATERIAL, CONSTRUCTION
1.14 The problem of personnel for the new organization was a difficult
one. Work began at a time when the scientific resources of the country
were already fully mobilized for other war work; many persons who would
have been willing to join the project had other commitments which could not
be broken. The nucleus of organization came from the groups that had been
engaged in fast neutron work under Oppenheimer, and who transferred their
work and equipment to Los Alamos. A number of other individuals and
groups were released to come, in part through the assistance of Conant as
Chairman of the NDRC. The greatest difficulty encountered was that of obtaining
an adequate staff of technical and administrative employees, who also
came mainly from occupational groups fully employed in war work. Here,
moreover, the disadvantages of isolation and restriction weighed heavily,
disadvantages largely overcome among the scientific staff by their interest
in the work and recognition of its importance.
1.15 The principal groups and individuals who made up the initial
scientific personnel are given below. Among those who had worked under
Oppenheimer in the preceding period were: from the University of California,
Robert Serber, E. M. McMillan, and others of Oppenheimer!s group; E. Segre,
J. W. Kennedy and their groups; from the University of Minnesota, J. H.
Williams and group; from the University of Wisconsin, J. L. McKibben and
group; from Stanford Universi@, F. Bloch, H. H. Staub, and group; from
Purdue Universi@, M. G. Holloway and group. Among those who came from
other parts of the DSM project, or from unrelated activities, were: from the
Radiation Laboratory of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, R. F. Bather
and H. A. Bethe; from the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of
Chicago, Edward Teller, R. F. Christy, D. K. Froman, A. C. Graves, J. H.
Mknley and group; from Princeton University, R. R. Wilson and group, J. E.
Mack, and R. P. Feynman; from the University of Rochester, V. F. Weisskopf;
from the Bureau of Standards, S. Neddermeyer; from the Ballistic Research
Laboratory at Aberdeen, D. R. Inglis; from the Universi@ of Illinois,
D. W. Kerst; from Barnes Hospital, St. Louis, Dr. L. H. Hempelmann; from
Memorial Hospital, New York, Dr. J. F. Nolan; from the National Research
Council, C. S. Smith; from Westinghouse Research Laboratories, E. U. Condon;
from Columbia University, E. A. Long; from the Geophysics Laboratory,
Carnegie Institution of Washington, C. L. Critchfield. MAny of these individuals
were on leave from other universities, having accepted temporary
war-time assignments in the above listed institutions.
1.16 In the procurement of laboratory equipment, machinery, and supplies,
there were also difficulties and delays. Even a specialized laboratory
requires a great variety of materials and equipment; as a going concern any
laboratory depends in large measure upon the accumulation of its past, in
stocks and in equipment that can be converted to new uses. Even though
much material had been ordered in advance, procurement channels were at
first slow, being indirect and newly organized.
1.17 Certain specialized equipment was brought to the project by the
groups that were to use it. The largest single item was the cyclotron on
loan from Harvard University. Before coming to Los Alamos, the Princeton
group under R. R. Wilson had gone to Harvard to become familiar with the
operation of this cyclotron and to disassemble it for shipment. McKibben?s
group brought with them from the University of Wisconsin two Van de Graaffs
(electrostatic generators). Manleyts group brought the Cockcroft-Walton accelerator
(D-D source) from the University of Illinois. The Berkeley group
brought chemical and cryogenic equipment, and all groups brought specialized
electronic and miscellaneous apparatus. Because of this initial equipment,
work was able to begin at Los Alamos much earlier than would otherwise
have been possible.
1.18 The initial plan of the laboratory was drafted by Oppenheimer,
Manley, and McMillan. It provided for an expected scientific staff of about
one hundred, and a somewhat larger total number, including admhistrative,
technical, and shop employees. The laboratory as planned contained the
following buildings: Building T, an office building to provide space for administration,
for the theoretical physics group, for a library, classified
document vault, conference rooms, a photographic laboratory, and a drafting
room; Building U, a general laboratory building; Building V, a shop building;
Buildings W, X, Y and Z, specialized laboratory buildings for the Van de
Graaffs, cyclotron, cryogenic laboratory, and Cockcroft-Walton accelerator,
respectively. (See Appendix 4).
1.19 Oppenheimer and a few members of the staff arrived in Santa Fe
on March 15, 1943. Prior to this time the project had been represented
locally by J. H. Stevenson, a resident of Santa Fe. Construction work was
incomplete. The laboratory buildings were still in the hands of the construction
contractors, as was the housing that had been planned to accommodate
Project Y and U. S. Engineer personnel. For this reason the first
project office was opened in Santa Fe. Since it was undesirable for reasons
of security to house the staff in Santa Fe hotels, guest ranches in the vicinity
were taken over temporarily, and transportation arranged to the site.
While the project office remained in Santa Fe, J. H. Williams lived at the
site as acting site director.
1.20 There is no doubt that the Laboratory staff and families
-7
faced the prospect of life at Los Alamos with enthusiasm and idealism. The
importance of their work and the excitement associated with it contributed
to this feeling, as did the possibility of building, under conditions of isolation
and restriction, a vigorous and congenial community.
1.21 The actualities of the first months were hard for many to view
in this light. Living conditions in the ranches around Santa Fe were difficult
. Several families, many with young children, were often crowded together
with inadequate cooking and other facilities. Transportation between
the ranches and Los Alamos was haphazard despite great efforts to regularize
it. The road was poor; there were too few cars and none of them were
in good condition. Technical workers were frequently stranded on the road
with mechanical breakdown or too many flat tires. Eating facilities at the
site were not yet in operation and box lunches had to be sent from Santa Fe.
It was winter, and sandwiches were not viewed with enthusiasm. The car
that carried the lunches was inclined to break down. The working day was
thus irregular and short, and night work impossible.
1.22 Until mid-April, telephone conversations between the site and
Santa Fe were possible only over a Forest Service line. It was sometimes
possible to shout brief instructions; discussions of any length, even over minor
matters, required an eighty mile round trip.
1.23 Frictions developed between the Laboratory members and U. S.
Engineer staff mainly because of the slowness of the construction contractor.
He was unable to get sufficient labor; he had trouble with the building trades
unions; he ,did not procure or titan rapidly enough the basic laboratory
equipment. Pressure to accelerate this work had to be brought through, and
therefore in part against, the military organization. lh some cases technical
supervisors were forbidden to enter buildings until they had been accepted
formally by the contracting agency (The Albuquerque District of the U. S.
Engineers). It was impossible to make minor changes, such as the placing
of shelves or the direction of a door; the buildings had first to be completed
and accepted as specified in the originaI drawings.
1.24 The initial problems were elementary and often enough, in retrospect,
minute. The difficulties were heightened by an administrative arrangement
which presupposed close cooperation without previous acquaintance between
two groups of widely divergent background and perspective, namely,
the project members and the military organization. Individually and in detail
these early troubles are of little moment in the history of Los Alamos.
Collectively, they had effects, some good and some bad, upon the spirit and
tone of the emerging project organization.
Technical Introduction
1.25 The project offices were moved to Los Alamos in the middle of
April; laboratory space and housing became available during April and my.
Activities during the month of April can be summarized under three topics:
(a) nontechnical adminstrative problems, (b) installation of laboratory equipment,
and (c) discus sion and planning of work. The present section will be
devoted to the last topic. Topics (a) and (b) will be treated with the period
following, to which they properly belong.
THE APRIL CONFERENCES
Introduction
1.26 During the last half of April a series of conferences were held
at Los Alamos for the dual purpose of acquainting new staff members with
the existing state of knowledge and of preparing a concrete program of research.
These conferences were attended by the staff which had already
moved to the project, by a few others mentioned above who could come permanently
only at a later date, and by certain consultants who were specially
invited. The last were I. I. Rabi of the Radiation Laboratory, M%sachusetts
Institute of Technology, and S. K. Allison and Enrico Fermi of the NIetallurgical
Laboratory, University of Chicago. All three of these men became
heavily involved in the work of the Laboratory at a later time. During the
conferences the project was visited by the members of a special reviewing
committee which had been appointed by General Groves. This committee,
whose report will be discussed, consisted of W. K. Lewis, Chairman, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; E. L. Rose, Director of Research for the
Jones and Lamson Machine Co.; J. H. Van Vleck and E. B. Wilson of Harvard
Universit~ and R. C. Tolman, Vice Chairman, NDRC, secretary of the
committee. Members of the committee also took part in the conferences.
1.27 Immediately prior to the conferences a set of lectures was given
by Serber as a kind of indoctrination course. A summary of these lectures
will provide an introduction and background for understanding the work of
the conference. These lectures reflected the state of knowledge at the time.
Within the scope indicated, and with much greater assurance and understanding
of detail, they still constitute an adequate statement of the nuclear physics
background.
-9
Theoretical Background
1.28 Energy Release. The energy release from nuclear fission is
about 170 million elect ron volts per nucleus. For U235t~s amo~ts to about
7X1017 ergs per gram. The energy released from an explosion of TNT is
about 4x10*0 ergs per gram. Hence$ roughly, a kilogram of U235is equivalent
in potential energy-release to 17,000 tons of TNT.
1.29 Chain Reaction. The large-scale release of energy from a mass
of fissionable material is made possible by a neutron chain reaction. In
fission the nucleus splits into two almost equal parts. These emit neutrons,
on the average between two and three. Each neutron may, in turn, cause the
fission of another heavy nucleus. This reaction can go on until it is stopped
by the depletion of fissionable material, or by other causes. U238,the principal
isotope ti ordinary uranium, i% sions only under the impact of high-
energy (about one million electron volt) neutrons. Neutrons from fission
have more than this energy initiallfi a large percentage of them, however,
are slowed by collisions to an energy below the fission threshold of U2S8.
The result is that each neutron is the parent of less than one neutron in the
next generation and the reaction is not self-sustaining.
1.30 Ordinary uranium contains, however, about O.7 per cent U236.
Neutrons of any energy will cause this isotope to fission; in fact, slow neutrons
are more effective than fast ones. The result is that a chain reaction
is just possible in the normal isotope mixture or l~alloy,M if a slowing-down
material is added to bring the neutrons down to the velocities at which they
most effectively cause the fission of U235. It is this chain reaction that is
used in the production of plutonium. Surplus neutrons are absorbed by the
U238 giving rise to the unstable isotope U239,which decays by successive
emi~sion of two electrons to the end-product PU239.
f
1.31 If the percentage of U235in uranium alloy is increased, a chain
reaction becomes possible with faster neutrons. A concentration is thus
reached at which no special slowing-down or moderating is needed other than I
what is provided by the uranium itself. The fastest possible reaction is obtained
from pure U2S5..
1.32 Critical Size, Tamper, Efficiency= IWthe fast chain reaction,
occurring in, say, metallic U235or Pu29g, a further limiting factor becomes
crucial. In practice only a fraction of the fission neutrons will cause new
fissions. The rest will leak out through the boundaries of the material. II
the fraction leaking out is too large, the reaction will fail to sustain itself.
If we consider a spherical mass of fissionable material at normal density,
the fraction leaking out will decrease with increasing radius of the sphere,
until on the average the birth rate of neutrons just co-mpensatcs for the rate '
at which they escape frorn the sphere. For a smaller sphere a chain reaction will die out; for a larger one, it will contjnue and grow exponentially.
This limiting radius is called the critical radius, and the corresponding mass,
the critical mass.
1.33 It is intuitively suggested that the critical radius should be of
the same order of magnitude as the average distance which neutrons travel
between successive fissions. For fast neutrons this distance of flight is ~
much larger than for slow neutrons; it is in fact 10 centimeters. Because !
of the great cost and limited supply 01 the materials available, it was essential
to reduce the critical size in any way possible. Tf the sphere of active
material were surrounded by a shell of less expensive material, this would
reflect at least some of the escaping neutrons back into the sphere, and thus
decrease the crittical mass. Early calculation had shown that any one of
several available reflector or Wamperl! materials would give a very substantial
reduction of the critical mass.
1.34 What has been said so far concerns only the static aspect of the
nuclear bomb. Given a more-than-critical mass of active material, what is
the course of the reaction? Once the reaction is started, the rate 01 fissioning,
and hence the release of energy, increases exl>onentially. I?rom the
energy release the material will be heated and begin to expand. From the
decrease in density of the active material the path between fissions will increase
more rapidly than the radius of the expanding mass, and hence more
neutrons will escape. Thus at some point the system will become subcritical
and the reaction will be qucnchcd. The point at which this quenching occurs
will determine the efficiency of the explosion, that is, the percentage of activq
nuclei fissioned.
1.35 l'he time available for an efficient nuclear reaction had been ,
shown to be extremeIy short. Release of 1 per cent of the energy would
give the second
The reaction would be quenched by an expansion of the order of
centimeters; this means that the energy release would have to occur in a
time of the order of hundredths of a microsecond. Since the mean time be:
tween fast neutron fissions is about O.01 xnicros ccond, arid since the largest
part of the energy release occurs in the last few fission generations, a reaction
of reasonable efficiency was evidently just possible.
1.36 Cross Sections. Calculation of the static and dynamic aspects of
the fission bomb presented difficulties both because of the elaboratcnsss of
I the theory involved and because of the dependence of these calculations on
I nuclear constants that were not, as yet, well memw red. Within the system
a neutron may be absorbed, scattered, or produce fission. The contributions
of each process are measured by the corresponding cross sections, or ef fective
target areas presented by the nucleus to an impinging neutron. The
total cross section is divided into areas that win, lose, or draw (fission,
absorb without fission, or scatter), these areas corresponding to the relative
probabilities of the three processes. If the scattering is not isotropic, it is
also necessary to specify the angular distribution of scattered neutrons. All
of these cross sections, moreover, depend upon the nucleus involved and the
energy of the tncident neutron. Calculation of cl*itical mass and efficiency
depends upon all of these cross sections, as well as upon the number of
neutrons per fission and density of material. It was clear that to obtain
such measurements with the necessary accuracy would entail an elaborate
program of experimental physics and a comparable effort of theoretical
physics to make the best use of information obtained.
1.37 Effects of Tamper. The effect of tamper is not only to decrease
the critical mass by reflecting neutrons back into the active material, but
also to increase the inertia of the system and therefore the time during
which it will remain in a supcrcri.tical state. These gains are somewhat
lessened by the longer time between fissions of neutrons reflcctcd back from
the tamper. The lengthenilig of the time is caused not only by the longer
path, but also by a loss of energy through inelastic scattering in the tamper.
Calculations of tie effect of tamper material depend thus on the absorption
and scattering cross sections of tamper material. It is interesting to note
that Serber!s eal*ly calculations gave, for a tamper of U238, a critical mass
for U2S5of 15 kilograms, and for Pu23gof 5 kilograms. Both figures are
correct to within a. reasonable error. This may be regarded as in part good
fortune, skce many of the assumption made were rough guesses. It nevertheless
serves to illustrate the advanced state of basic theory at the time.
1.38 Efficiency, Detonation, and Predetonation. Some ~ldication has
been given above of the basis for efficiency calculations. The outcome of
such calculations was to show that efficiencies would be low. There is,
moreover, another essential factor in efficiency, connected with the problcm
of assembly and detonation, the early discussion of which is reviewed below.
1.39 It is irdh~r~llt in the nature of explosive reactions that they can
be set off by relatively minute forces, the requirement being, in general, a
disturbance sufficiently great to initiate some type of chain reaction. Chemical
explosives can be protected with greater or less certainty from such external
forces as may initiate a reaction. A supercritical mass of nuclear
explosive, however, cannot be protected from 'accidental 1I detonation. Chain
reactions will begin spontaneously with greater certainty than in the most
unstable chemical compounds. Cosmic ray neutrons will enter the mass
from outside. Others will be generated in it from the spontaneous fissions
that constantly occur in uranium and plutonium. Still others come from
nuclear reactions, most importantly from the (a, n) reaction in light element
impurities. The problems presented by this meutron background f1 are re sponsible
for a considerable part of the project ?s history. From the first
and weakest source alone (cosmic rays) any supercritical mass will be detonated
within a fraction of a second, from other unavoidable sources within a
very much shorter time.
1.40 The only method for detonating a nuclear bomb is, therefore, to
bring it into a supercritical configuration just at the time when it is to be
detonated. The required speed of assembly depends upon the neutron background.
As the parts of the bomb move together, the system passes smoothly
from its initial subcritical to its final supercritical state. Chain reactions
may, however, set in at any time after the critical position has been reached.
If the velocity of assembly is small compared to the rate of the nuclear
chain reaction, and if predetonation occurs, the explosion will be over before
assembly for maximum efficiency has occurred. Thus the explosion may
occur, with a widely varying range of efficiencies, at any time between the
critical and the final supercritical positions. To decrease the probability of
predetonation and consequent low efficiencies requires either a higher speed
of assembly or a lower neutron background.
1.41 Gun Assembly, Initiator. The considerations of the last section
indicate the magnitude of the assembly problem: to initiate properly and reliably
a reaction whose entire course occurs in a fraction of a microsecond,
subject to the complementary needs for high velocity assembly and low neutron
background. As was mentioned above, the principal source of neutron
background is the (a, n) reaction in light-element impurities. To lower this
background would require a strenuous program of chemical purification.
1.42 The most straightforward early proposal for meeting these difficulties
was the method of gun assembly; the general proposal was that a
projectile of active and tamper material, or of active material alone, be shot
through or laterally past a target of active material and tamper. For U235
both the chemical purity requirements and the needed velocity of assembly
were attainable by known methods. Many difficult engineering problems were
evidently involved, but they did not appear as insuperable. For PU2S9the requirements
for purity and speed were both somewhat beyond the established
range. It seemed, however, that by rather heroic means they could be met.
1.43 High velocity assembly and the reduction of the neutron background
would decrease the probability of predetonation; they would also
decrease the probability of detonation at the desired time. Unless material
could be assembled so as to remain in its optimum configuration for a considerable
length of time, there was a danger that lpostdetonation?l too would
give low efficiency, or that the system would pass through its supercritical
state without detonation occurring at all. To overcome this difficulty it
would be necessary to develop a strong neutron source that could be turned
on at the right moment. Theoretically feasible schemes for such an initiator -
had been conceived, but their practicability was not assured.
1.44 Autocatalysis, Implosion. Two other methods of assembly had
been proposed, and it was a part of the early program to investigate them.
One of these was a self-assembling or autocatalytic method, operating by the
compression or expulsion of neutron absorbers during the reaction. Calculation
showed that this method as it stood would require large quantities of
material and would give only very low efficiencies.
1.45 The second alternative method was that of implosion.
1.46 The Deuterium Bomb or lfhper. 1t There existed, at the time of
the April Conference, one other important proposal to which considerable
thought and discussion had been given in the previous months. This was a
proposal to use the fission bomb as a means for initiating a nuclear reaction
of a different type from that involved in the fissioning of heavy-element nuclei.
Fissioning, the disruption of nuclei with liberation of energy, is a
somewhat anomalous reaction restricted to the heaviest nuclei. Among the
lighter elements the typical exoergic (energy-producing) reaction is the building
up of heavier nuclei from lighter ones. For example, two deuterium
(H2) nuclei may combine to form a He3 nucleus and a neutron, or a tritium
nucleus (Hs) and a proton. The energy that is liberated goes into kinetic
energy and radiation. If such a reaction occurs in a mass of deuterium, it
will spread under conditions similar to those that control ordinary thermochemical
reactions. Hence the reaction is called thermonuclear. The cross .,
section for a reaction between two deuterium nuclei is strongly dependent
upon the energy of the nuclei. At low energies the probability that the re-
i
.
action will occur is very small. As the temperature of the material increases,
the reaction becomes more probable. Finally a critical temperature
is reached, where the nuclear reactions in the material just compensate
for various kinds of energy 10Ss, such as heat conduction and radiation. The
thermonuclear reaction is in detail more complicated than has been indicated,
because of the presence of a variety of secondary reactions.
1.47 Among available materials, deuterium has the lowest ignition
temperature. This temperature was estimated to be about 35 kilovolts (about "
400 million degrees), and is actually somewhat lower. Once ignited, deuterium -
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is about 5 times as energy-productive per unit mass as U235. Thus 1 kilogram
of deuterium equals about 85,000 tons of TNT equivalent. Since it is
not more difficult to ignite a large than a small mass of deuterium, and
since it is more cheaply produced in usable form than either U235or PU239,
the proposed weapon, using a fission bomb as a detonator and deuterium as
explosive, could properly be called an atomic super-bomb. The development
of this super-bomb was perforce secondary to that of the fission bomb; on
the other hand its potentialities were so great that research toward its development
could not be completely neglected.
1.48 It should be mentioned at this point that in the early period of
the project the most careful attention was given to the possibility that a
thermonuclear reaction might be initiated in light elements of the Earth fs
atmosphere or crust. The easiest reaction to initiate, if any, was found to
be a reaction between nitrogen nuclei in the atmosphere. It was assumed
that only the most energetic of several possible reactions would occur, and
that the reaction cross sections were at the maximum values theoretically
possible. Calculation led to the result that no matter how high the temperature,
energy loss would exceed energy production by a reasonable factor.
At an assumed temperature of three million electron volts the reaction failed
to be self-propagating by a factor of 60. This temperature exceeded the calculated
initial temperature of the deuterium reaction by a factor of 100, and
that of the fission bomb by a larger factor.
1.49 The impossibility of igniting the atmosphere was thus assured by
science and common sense. The essential factors in these calculations, the
Coulomb forces of the nucleus, are among the best understood phenomena of
modern physics. The philosophic possibility of destroying the earth, associated
with the theoretical convertibilityy of mass into energy, remains. The
thermonuclear reaction, which is the only method now known by which such
a catastrophe could occur, is evidently ruled out. The general stability of
matter in the observable universe argues against it. Further lmowledge of
the nature of the great stellar explosions, novae and supernovae, will throw
light on these questions. In the almost complete absence of real knowledge,
it is generally believed that the tremendous energy of these explosions is of
gravitational rather than nuclear origin.
1.50 More immediate and less spectacular global dangers to humanity
arise from the use of thermonuclear bombs, or even fission bombs, in war:
principally from the possible magnitude of destruction and from radioactive
poisoning of the atmosphere (13.14).
1.51 Damage. So far we have reviewed only the early discussion of
energy release. Since, however, the purpose of the project was to produce
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o
an effective weapon, it was necessary to compare the atomic bomb with
ordinary bombs, not merely as to energy release, but more concretely as
to destructive effects. Damage could be classified under several headings:
The psychological effects of the use of such a weapon; the physiological effects
of the neutrons, radioactive material and radiation produced; the mechanical
destruction produced by the shock wave of the explosion. Estimation
of the first was not of course within the means or jurisdiction of the
project. Of the second, it was estimated that lethal effects might be ex
. petted within a radius of 1000 yards of the bomb. The radioactivity remaining
might be expected to render the locality of the explosion unin&bitable
for a considerable period, although this effect would depend on the percentage
of activity left behind, which was as yet an unknown quantity. The
principal damage would be caused by the mechanical effects of the explosion.
These effects were difficult to estimate. Some rough data on the effects of
large explosive disasters were available. More reliable information was
available concerning the effects of small high explosive bombs, but it was
not known for sure how these effects should be scaled upward for high energy
atomic bombs. Serber ts report gives an estimate of a destruction radius of
about 2 miles for a 100,000 ton bomb. Members of the British mission who
came to the project somewhat later were able to add to the understanding of
this topic from their national experience and their research of recent years.
DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAM
Introduction
1.52 From the previous outline of the state of knowledge at the beginning
of Project Y, it is clear that the greatest problems were bound to
arise on the side of development and engineering. There was still much
work to be done in nuclear physics proper, but enough was lmown to eliminate
great uncertainties from this side of the picture. It should not be concluded,
however, that the stage of research was past its prime, to be dominated
in turn by problems of application. The normal meanings attached to
t!research, !! ~~evelopment, ??and ?~engineering!! are altered in the context of
wartime science generally; that is particularly true of the atomic bomb
project. TWO features have determined its gene ral character. The first is
the domination of research schedules by production schedules; the second is
the nature of the weapon itself. Time schedules for the production of U2S5
and PU239were such that the laboratory had before it about two years until
explosive amounts of these materials would be available. After that time
every month ~s delay had to be counted as a 10SS to the war. The practical
.
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1"
consequence was that many kinds of information had to be gotten at the
earliest possible date, with greatest difficulty, even though at a later date
the same information could be gotten more easily and reliably. The micro-
metallurgy of plutonium was investigated at Chicago, for example, because it
was vital, among
other things, to know the density of the new material as
soon as possible; the first measurement was made with great labor, from a
sample of only a few micrograms. The value of such information depended
upon its capacity to influence decisions which could not be postponed. This
meant a heavy dependence upon theory and upon measurements of the @pe
needed to answer
theoretical questions. To some extent reliance was placed
upon theoretical anticipations because of the all-or-none character of the
weapon. A purely experimental nuclear explosion would involve the dissipa
tion of at least one critical mass of material that might have been used
against the enemy. If tests were to be made at all, only one or two would
be possible. For
so small a number of tests to be meaningful, they would
have to have a large a priori probability of success. Although this question
of tests was not decided at the beginning of the project, certain general im
plications were clear: The bombls component parts and phases of operation
had to be designated and tested separately, with reliance upon theory to sup
ply a picture of its integral operation.
1.53 It is not remarkable, in the light of what has been said, that the
•
initial program, personnel, and equipment of the Laboratory gave it the appearance
of a purely research organization. That it had this appearance was
partly a matter of previous history; nuclear research was the most advanced
part of the program, and its personnel and equipment were most easily available.
In part, however, the research character of the organization was a
matter of considered policy. Normally, the engineer is the tlpractical man!!
who translates ideas into practice. Here, not only the ideas but also the
standards of practice were new. To keep the center of policy in the research
group was not to minimize the importance of the engineering work, but to
emphasize its difficulty. Secondary problems undeniably arose from this
policy, which displaced the engineer from his normal position, and only through
trial and error created for him a new place in the division of project labor.
Theoretical Program
1.54 Enough has been said to indicate the central position in the Laboratory
of its theoretical program. As it emerged from the conferences this
program had as its main goal to analyze the explosion and develop the associated
techniques of calculation, and to give nuclear specifications for the
.
•
.
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bomb with increasing reliability and accuracy as new physical data became
available. Calculations had to be made for three materials: U2S5,PU2S8,and
also a new compound, a hydride of uranium, which seemed to have certain
advantages over metallic uranium as a bomb material. Calculations also had
to be made for a variety of shapes of the active mass, and for different
combinations of bomb and tamper material. For critical mass calculations
the theory of neutron diffusion in bomb and tamper had to be refined, and
account taken of the energy distribution of fission neutrons, as well as the
dependence of nuclear cross sections upon those energies. For efficiency
calculation, further study was needed of the hydrodynamics of the explosion,
taking account of the effects of the large amounts of radiation liberated in
the process. Further investigation was needed of the problems connected
with time of assembly, detonation, and predetonation.
1.55 In addition to these problems relating to bomb design, the theoretical
program included a variety of analyses and calculations connected
with the experimental program, ranging from ordinary service calculations
to the design of a slow chain-reacting unit with U2s5-enriched uranium.
1.56 The program included, finally, the further investigation of bomb
damage, of the possibility of autocatalytic methods of assembly, and the proposal
to amplify the effect of fission bombs by using them to initiate thermonuclear
reactions.
Program of Experimental Physics
1.57 The program of experimental physics formulated during and immediately
after the conferences falls under two main headings: Detailed and
integral experiments. Detailed or differential experiments are those which
attempt to observe the effects of isolated nuclear phenomena. From a sufficient
number of experimental data gained in this way, an integral picture of
the operation of the bomb could be built up within a framework of theory.
Integral experiments, on the other hand, were -at least in their early conception
-attempts to duplicate in experimental arrangement some of the
over-all properties of the bomb. Experiments of the two kinds were intended
to supplement each other wherever possible, on the one hand to sharpen the
interpretation of integral experiments, on the other to show up possible omissions
of elements from the detailed picture. In practice, it has proved extremely
difficult to devise integral experiments which in any way dupIicate
the conditions obtaining in the bomb. The integral experiments that have
been performed have had rather the effect of checking theory in situations in
some ways similar to the bomb.
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.
1.58 A brief outline of the program as first developed will serve also
to indicate the state of experimental knowledge carried over from the previous
period.
1.59 Differential
Experiments.
Neutron Number. The average number of neutrons per fission
had never been measured directly, although the Chicago project had measured
the number of neutrons from U235per thermal neutron absorbed. The number
of neutrons per fission could be calculated from this measurement and
from the ratio of fissions to captures, which, however, was not known reliably
in the region of thermal energies. The neutron number of PU239was
completely unknown although it was expected to differ but little from that of
U235C
The first experiments planned were, in fact, measurements of neutrons
from PU239.
1.60 These latter measurements were of intrinsic importance, and were
needed at the earliest date possible to confirm the wisdom of heavy commitments
already made for the production of plutonium in quantity.
1.61 Fission SPectrum. The energy range of neutrons from the fission
of U235had been investigated by the British, and by the Rice Institute and
Stanford subprojects. These measurements suffered from the large dilution
•
of isotope 235 by 238 in normal uranium. Work had already been begun at
Minnesota with enriched material, and this program was to be continued at
Los Alamos.
1.62 Fission Cross Sections. Fission cross sections had been measured
by the subproject under N. P. Heydenberg at the Department of Terrestrial
Magnetism of Carnegie Institute, by McKibben ~s group at Wisconsin, and
by Segr&~s group in Berkeley. These measurements -for U235-covered the
neutron energy range above 125 kev, and the range below 2 ev. When the
curve for fission cross sections over the high energy was extrapolated downward,
a figure was obtained for thermal energy that was much larger than
the cross section actually observed. Since the extrapolated region covered
the important range of neutron energies in a bomb of uranium hydride, measurements
were planned to investigate cross sections at these intermediate
energies and resolve the apparent anomaly. Fission cross sections of PU239
were already known at thermal energies and at a few high energies. Here
also measurements were planned to cover the entire range of energies up to
about 3 Mev.
1.63 Delayed Neutron Emission. Experiments at Cornell had shown
that there was no appreciable delay beyond 10 microseconds in the emission
. of neutrons from fission; one of the initial experiments planned at Los Alamos
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o
was to push this time down to 0.1 microsecond; on theoretical grounds it was
expected that the number delayed even for this time would be small.
1.64 Capture and Scattering Cross Sections. At the beginning of the
project little was known about capture and scattering cross sections. Some
measurements of capture and inelastic scattering cross sections had been
made at Chicago for normal uranium. Experiments by the Minnesota group
had given values for elastic and inelastic scattering in uranium for high
energies. The Wisconsin group had measured large-angle elastic scattering
in a number of potential tamper materials. Capture cross section measurements
were made by Segr& at Berkeley. The principal work planned for the
Los Alamos Laboratory was on the scattering and absorption cross sections
of U2S5and PU2S9, and the capture and scattering cross sections of various
tamper materials.
1.65 One new type of scattering measurement, not previously undertaken,
was planned for this Laboratory. This was the measurement of scattering
into different solid angles. When so averaged as to give the effective
scattering in a given direction, this average is the so-called transport cross
section.
1.66 Jntegral Experiments. Certain integral experiments had been performed
at Chicago, in comection with the development of the slow neutron
chain-reacting pile. These were not of direct interest to the bomb project.
Two types of integral experiments were, however, planned in the early experimental
physics program.
1.67 Integral Tamper Experiments. Several experiments were planned
to measure the scattering in potential tamper materials; these were designed
to imitate the scattering properties of a tamper in the actual bomb.
1.68 The ?Water Boiler.?' At the April Conferences there was some
discussion of the possibility of constructing a slow chain-reacting unit, using
uranium with enriched U235content in water solution. The construction of
such a unit would provide a useful neutron source for experimental purposes,
and would also give practice in the operation of a super-critical unit. The
decision to make such a unit was not reached until some time later.
1.69 Experimental Techniques. A large subsidiary program was called
for, to investigate techniques for producing and counting neutrons of a given
energy, for measuring fissions in various materials, and for measuring
neutron-induced reactions other than fission. The systematic recording of
nuclear properties entailed by the experimental program required both ac curacy
and standardization of a number of difficult techinques; the program
of instrumentation represented theref ore a major activity of the Laboratory.
Program of Chemistry and Metallurgy
1.70 During the course of the DSM Project a large amount of research
had been carried out on the chemistry and metallurgy of uranium. The
microchemistry and micrometallurgy of plutonium were investigated at
Chicago as soon as small amounts of the material were available. The
chemical investigations were necessary as a basis for designing methods of
recovering plutonium from the pile material and lldecontaminating! 1 it, i.e.,
separating it from radioactive fission products.
1.71 At the beginning of the Los Alamos Project the exact division of
labor between its chemistry laboratory and other laboratories had not been
settled. There were objective difficulties and uncertainties of program. It
was not known whether U235,PU239or both would be used, or whether the
bomb material would be metal or compound. U233,producible from thorium
by a process of "breeding" similar to that by which PU239is made from U238,
was also a possibility. Mechanical requirements for the bomb material could
not yet be specified. Here also a characteristic difficulty appeared, in that
the time for research with gram and kilogram amounts of material would
have to be as short as possible, in order to avoid delay in bomb production.
1.72 One certainty was a schedule of purity requirements for U235and
~2390
Because of the large alpha radioactivity of the latter substance, light
impurities had almost to be eliminated. Most light elements had to be present
in not more than a few parts per million. For U235these tolerances
could be greatly relaxed. Although it was not yet determined whether the
work of final purification would be carried on at Los Alamos or elsewhere,
an analytical program was necessary to develop techniques for measuring small
amounts of impurity in small samples of material.
1.73 A radiochemistry program was needed to prepare materials to be
used in nuclear experiments and in the development of a neutron initiator for
the bomb.
1.74 The metallurgy program included research and development on
the metal reduction of uranium and plutonium, the casting and shaping of
these metals and compounds such as uranium hydride, as well as various
possible tamper materials. Investigation of the physical properties of uranium
and plutonium was needed, and a search had to be made for alloys with
physical properties superior to those of the unalloyed metals. As its main
service function, the metallurgy group would be called upon to prepare materials
for physical and ordnance experiments, particularly projectile, target,
and tamper materials for the gun program.
1.75 As a somewhat autonomous part of the chemistry program, plans
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were made for the construction of a deuterium liquefaction plant at Los
Alamos. This was to supply liquid deuterium for experimental purposes and
for eventual use in the thermonuclear bomb, should its development prove
feasible and necessary.
Ordnance Program
1.76 It had been recognized from the beginning that the most difficult
of all problems facing the project was to find means for the assembly of
several critical masses of material, fast enough to produce a successful
high-order explosion. Subsidiary but still very difficult problems were those
of incorporating active material, tamper, and assembly mechanism into a
practical airborne bomb. These were the problems of the ordnance division
of the project, a division which could hardly be said to exist at the beginning.
As a matter of fact, no pre-existing group could have had much success in
this work. A new field of engineering was being explored; experience has
shown that those successful in this work come from a variety of technical
backgrounds, all of which contribute to the field and none of which dominate
it: physicists, chemists, and electrical and mechanical engineers.
1.77 A corollary feature of the ordnance program has been its simultaneous
investigation of alternative methcds. The uncertainties of nuclear
specification, and the possibility that one or another line of investigation might
fail, have made such a policy unavoidable. Of the three methods of producing
a fission bomb (autocatalysis, the gun, the implosion) that have been discussed,
the last two were singled out for early development. Autocatalysis was not
eliminated; but it was not subject to development until some scheme was proposed
which would give a reasonable efficiency. This did not occur during
the course of the project, although autocatalytic methods continued to receive
considerable theoretical attention. Of the remaining two methods, the gun
appeared the more practical; it used a known method of accelerating large
masses to high velocities. The problem of "catching" a projectile in a target
and starting a chain reaction in the resulting supercritical mass was obviously
a difficult one, but it seemed soluble.
1.78 The method of implosion, on the other hand, was much farther
removed from existing practice. The requirement of simultaneous detonation
over the surface of a high explosive sphere presented unknown and possibly
insoluble difficulties; the behavior of solid matter under the thermodynamical
conditions created by an implosion went far beyond current laboratory experience.
As even its name implies, the implosion seemed I!against nature. t!
Its investigation was at first undertaken as something to fall back on in case
.
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.'
the gun should, contrary to expectation, fail. Credit for the early support
and investigation of this method should be given to S. H. Neddermeyer, who
at the beginning was almost alone in his belief in the superiority of the
method. At a meeting on ordnance problems late in April, Neddermeyer
presented the first serious theoretical analysis of the implosion. His arguments
showed that the compression of a solid sphere by detonation of a surrounding
high-explosive layer was feasible, and that it would be superior to
the gun method both in its higher velocity and shorter path of assembly. Investigation
of the method was begun almost immediately. It subsequently
received two increases of priority, until at the end of the project it had become
the dominant program throughout the Laboratory.
1.79 During the April conferences, the discussion of ordnance served
mainly to outline the problems. Considerable attention had been given to the
problem of gun design by R. C. Tolman. One member of the reviewing committee
at Los Alamos in April was E. L. Rose, an expert in problems of
gun design. Rose showed that by the sacrifice of durability, a quite unessential
property, the otherwise prohibitive size and weight of a large gun could
be reduced to a point where, together with the target, it could be included in
a practical bomb. Other elements of the ordnance program discussed were:
internal ballistics of the gun, external and terminal ballistics (guiding and
seating of the projectile, initiating of the chain reaction), safety, arming and
fuzing devices, release, and trajectory of the bomb from a plane.
1.80 It is inappropriate to discuss in detail the experimental program
of ordnance at this point. Experimental work did not get under way for several
months. On the agenda for immediate action were the prior problems
of obtaining test guns and high explosives, of building a proving ground, and
of employing or tkaining personnel to carry on the research.
Report of the Reviewing Committee
1.81 The reviewing committee referred to in paragraph 1.26 was appointed
by General Groves to report on the organization of the Los Alamos
Project and on the status and program of its technical work. The chief
question before this committee was the status of the ordnance program. The
initial conception of the project fs general program was that research in nuclear
physics should be virtually completed before undertaking a large-scale
ordnance development. In March 1943, however, Oppenheimer had written a
memorandum on ordnance, in which he urged that experimental work be undertaken
as early as possible, and that it receive recognition as one of the
most urgent of the project ?s outstanding problems. Tolman recognized the
-23
importance of the issue thus raised, and recommended the appointment of
Rose to the reviewing committee as an expert on ordnance matters.
1.82 The report of the reviewing committee, dated lthy 10, 1943, was
concerned with the administrative organization of the project, and with the
status and program of the technical work. Since certain of the recommendations
of the committee had an important bearing on the further development
of the project, the main features of its report are outlined below.
A. NUCLEAR PHYSICS RESEARCH
1.83 After an extensive review of the program of nuclear physics, the
committee stated its approval of all of this, the most advanced part of the
work. It took note of the newly discovered possibility for use of uranium
hydride. Pointing out that the existence of the hydride had been learned of
at Los Alamos somewhat by accident, the committee recommended a more
systematic technical liaison between this and other branches of the larger
project. It also recommended that the study of U2S3as a possible explosive
material be continued.
B. LESS DEVELOPED PARTS OF THE PROGRAM
1.84 The committee reported on the program for investigation of the
thermonuclear reaction, the chemistry and metallurgy program, and on the
program of engineering and ordnance.
1.85 As for the thermonuclear bomb, the committee recommended that
its investigation be pursued, but along mainly theoretical lines, and with priority
subordinate to that of the fission bomb. This confirmed the Laboratory
policy already established.
1.86 Concerning both the chemistry and engineering programs, the committee
recommended a substantial revision of earlier policy. One of the principal
organizational questions at the time was the jurisdiction of the chemistry
purification program. As stated above, the purification of active material,
particularly Pu23g, presented a major technological problem. The chemistry
of plutonium was first investigated by Kennedy, Seaborg, Segrb, and Wahl, its
discoverers. The investigation was pursued and would first be practiced by
the Metallurgical Laboratory chemists, in connection with their problem of
separation and decontamination of plutonium produced in the piles at Oak
Ridge and Hanford. It was arguable that the further step of purification,
upon which such stringent requirements were placed, should be carried out
by the same group. The committee recommended, however, that the purification
program be carried on at Los Alamos instead. Its reasons for this
.
-24
o
recommendation were not only that the Los Alamos Project would be responsible
for the correct functioning of the ultimate weapon, but also that a
considerable amount of repurification work would in any case be a consequence
of the experimental use of material at this project.
1.87 The second major recommendation of the committee was in agreement
with the earlier statement of Oppenheimer -that the work of ordnance
development and engineering should be undertaken as soon as possible. The
committee stated its opinion that the time had arrived for close connection
between nuclear and engineering research. While there remained from the
side of nuclear specifications a wide range of possible designs for the final
weapon, the committee believed that further determination of design would
have to depend as well upon engineering specifications. The committee also
pointed out that engineering research was needed in connection with the development
of safety, arming, firing, and detonating devices, portage of the
bomb by plane, and determination of the bomb trajectory.
1.88 Both the above recommendations entailed a major expansion of
project personnel and facilities. For the purification program, the estimated
increase of chemists and technicians was thirty, and a corresponding increase
of laboratory facilities. For ordnance and engineering work, the committee
estimated that this would require a two-fold increase of project personnel,
with an extensive increase of offices, drafting rooms, shops, and test areas
for ballistic and explosives work.
C.
ADMINISTRATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS AND GENERAL
CONCLUSIONS
1.89 The committee's recommendations on matters of organization and
administration fall under the headings of personnel, procurement, security,
and morale. Under the first the committee gave strong commendation to
Oppenheimer as director. The creation of three administrative positions was
recommended, as soon as competent persons could be found to fill them.
The first was a director of ordnance and engineering, to take charge of the
recommended program. The second was an associate director, a man in
charge of some major phase of the scientific work and able to assist the
director and take charge in his absence. The third was an adm.ifistrative
officer, to take charge of nontechnical administrative matte rs; in particular,
to maintain cordial and effective relations with the military administration.
On the general personnel situation the committee reported favorably, both as
to the competence and the work assignments of scientific personnel.
1.90 The committee was dissatisfied with the organization and functioning
of the procurement system. The procurement officer, Mitchell, they
-25
found to be well qualified for the position by technical training and experience.
Their principal criticism was directed toward the operation of the
University of California Purchasing Office in Los Angeles, which in their
opinion had been responsible for serious and avoidable delays. The committee
recommended establishment of a second purchasing office in New York
under separate contract.
1.91 The security policy established by the Director under the authority
granted him met with the committee's approval.
1.92 The final administrative recommendation of the committee, one
which in its nature could not be entirely specific, concerned morale and the
maintenance of the ?Ispecial kind of atmosphere that is conducive to effective
scientific work.~! The committee recognized that this was made difficult by
the isolation and military character of the post, and it was therefore in the
achievement of better relations between the military and technical organizations
that the committee saw hope for the maintenance of morale.
SUMMARY
1.93 The period of the April Conferences and of the reviewing committee
~s examination of program and organization provides a natural introduction
to the problems of the new project. Enough has been said to indicate
that the greatest problems were connected with the need to develop a
new type of engineering research, translating the schematic conception of an
atomic bomb into an effective military weapon. Both objectively and subjectively,
these problems were rendered more difficult by the newness and
isolation of the Laboratory, and by the duality of military and technical organizations.
-26
.
.
Chapter II
THE BRITISH MISSION
2.1 In December 1943 the first representatives of the British atomic
bomb project came to Los Alamos. Their arrival marked the climax of a
long series of negotiations between the British, Canadian, and American governments
seeking to integrate the scientific work being done in all three
countries on atomic bomb research (1.3). These first representatives were
O. R. Frisch and E. W. Titterton.
2.2 Although Britain's T. A. Project (The Directorate of Tube Alloys)
had had a very high priority in 1942, so many of her physicists and so much
of her industrial capacity were engaged in other urgent war work that it was
impossible to undertake as large a program as the United States had launched.
The British organization decided to limit itself to particular phases of the
problem, and established research teams in various university and industrial
laboratories.
2.3 In the summer of 1942, sufficient progress toward collaboration
had been made so that the British reports on the theory of fission and the
fission bomb were accessible to Oppenheimer's group in Berkeley, as well
as reports of experimental measurements of nuclear constants. At that
time the British analysis of the bomb mechanism was somewhat more advanced
than in the United States, so that access to these reports was of substantial
value. In November 1942 a memorandum ~was written by Oppenheimer
to R. E. Peierls describing the theoretical work that had been done at Berkeley
and discus sing certain points of difference between British and American
theoretical work. The incompletenesss of collaboration at this time is indicated
by the fact that in the memorandum referred to there could be no mention
of the deuterium bomb.
2.4 In the fall of 1943 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill had discussed the possibilities for closer collaboration between the
two countries in hastening the production of atomic bombs. As a result of
-27
.
their discussions a Combined Policy Committee was set up in Washington.
One of this committee's decisions was to move a large number of British
scientists to work in American laboratories. Evidence of the genuineness
of cooperation that resulted from this sacrifice on Britain ~s part is the fact
that British scientists were given assignments in all parts of the American
project, especially at Los Alamos, the most highly classified section of alL
2.5 At this time Niels Bohr, the eminent Danish physicist, escaped
from Denmark to England, where he was appointed adviser on scientific
matters to the British Government. His scientific advice was made available
to the United States as well. Bohr and his son Aage came to Los
Alamos in December 1943, a short time after Frisch and Titterton. To ensure
his personal safety and as a security precaution, Bohr was known as
Nicholas Baker and his son as James Baker. Great care was taken to prevent
any reference to their real names, even in classified documents. The
Bohrs did not become resident members of the Los Alamos Laboratory, but
made several extended visits as consultants.
2.6 When Bohr came to the Laboratory he found there a large number
of his former students, and his coming had a very healthy influence on research.
He came at the right moment. The exigencies of production, the
innumerable small problems which confronted the physicists, had led them
away from some of the fundamental problems of the bomb. The study of the
fission process itself, for example, had been neglected, and this obstructed
reliable predictions of important phenomena, such as the energy-dependence
of the branching ratio between fission and neutron capture (6.44). Here
Bohr's interest gave rise to new theoretical and experimental activities
which cleared up many questions that were left unanswered before. Some
of the most important experiments on the velocity selector were made at
his instigation (6.38). His influence was felt strongly in research on the
nuclear properties of tamper materials.
2.7 Bohr!s criticism and his concern for new and better methods enlivened
the discus sion of alternative means of bomb assembly. Although
these discussions showed in the end that the "orthodox" implosion was still
the best method, their value was to prove that its choice was, despite its
many difficulties, the correct one. Bohr participated very actively in the
design of the initiator.
2.8 Last but not least, his influence on the morale of the Laboratory
must be mentioned. It went further than having the great founder of atomic
research in the Laboratory, and farther than the stimulus of his fresh suggestions.
He saw the administrative troubles of the Laboratory in a better
and longer view than many of those enmeshed in them. His influence was to
.
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bring about stronger and more consistent cooperation with the army in the
pursuit of the common goal. And what can be least overlooked, he gave
everybody who was in contact with him some of his understanding of the
ultimate significance of the control of atomic energy.
2.9 Another of the Laboratoryfs most useful British consultants was
Sir Geoffrey I. Taylor. Los Alamos was staffed primarily with nuclear
physicists, who lacked experience with hydrodynamical investigations. III
investigating the hydrodynamics of the implosion and the nuclear explosion,
therefore, their work suffered from being too formal and mathematical.
Apart from the contributions of the American consultant John von Neumann
(7.54), most of the simple intuitive considerations which give true physical
understanding came from discus sions with Taylor. His most important general
cent ribution was the understanding of the !lTaylor instabilityy,~~which is
the generalization that when a light material is pushing a heavy material,
the interface between them is unstable (5.26). This principle was important
in the theory of jets, in the interpretation of high-explosive experiments, in
the design of the initiator, in the design of the implosion bomb, and in the
predictions about the nuclear explosion (5.43). To him also was due the
stimulus for serious theoretical investigation of the 1!ball of fire ~~phenomena
.
(11.20).
2.10 Technical contributions of the resident staff of the British Mission
are mentioned in appropriate parts of the text on the same basis as the work
of their American colleagues.
2.11 Sir James Chadwick of the Cavendish Laboratory, scientific adviser
to the British members of the Combined Policy Committee in Washington,
came to Los Alamos early in 1944 to head the British Mission. It
was not certain at first whether the British group would work under Chad-
wick on the problems of his choosing, or whether they would be assigned to
existing groups in the Laboratory. The latter arrangement was adopted, and
eventually British scientists worked in nearly all of the Laboratory divisions.
Seven were experimental nuclear physicists, two were electronics experts,
five were theoretical physicists, and five were experts in the properties and
effects of explosives.
2.12 Lord Cherwell, Churchill 1s personal adviser on scientific matters,
visited Los Alamos in October 1944.
2.13 Chadwick stayed in Los Alamos only a few months. His successor
as head of the Mission was Peierls.
2.14 Apart from the consultants already mentioned, the British Mission
staff consisted of the following: E. Bretscher, B. Davison, A. P. French,
-29
O. R. Frisch, K. Fuchs, J. Hughes, D. J. Littler, Carson Mhrk*, W. G.
Marley, D. G. N12mhll, P. B. Moon, W. F. Moon (secretary), R. E. Peierls,
W. J. Penney, G. Placzek, M. J. Poole, J. Rotblat, H. Sheard, T. H. R.
Skyrme, E. W. Titterton, J. L. Tuck.
.
*Although several members of the Mission came to Los Alamos via
the Canadian and United Kingdom Laboratory in Montreal, all were attached
to the British staff except Mark, who remained in the employ of the Ckmadian
Government.
-30
Chapter III
THE PERIOD APRIL 1943 TO AUGUST 1944, GENERAL REVIEW
General Administrative Matters
LABORATORY ORGANIZATION
3.1 The first period of the Los A.lames Laboratory 1s existence presented
the problems common to organizational beginning: the definition of
program, the division of responsibilities, and liaison. Of these the first has
been discussed in the first chapter. The division of responsibilities follows
•
that of the program: Experimental Physics, Theoretical Physics, Chemistry
and Metallurgy, Ordnance. Each of these was organized as an administrative
division, consisting of a number of operating units or groups. Group Leaders
were made responsible to their respective Division Leaders, and Division
Leaders to the Director. Ii-Ia position of responsibility parallel to that of
the Director was established a Governing Board. This consisted of the Director,
Division Leaders, general administrative officers, and individuals in
important technical liaison positions.
3.2 The building of the Laboratory was more than the planning and
implementing of its technical work. Especially at first the Governing Board
meetings were the only regular occasions for viewing in a general political
way the many questions that appeared. As a center for planning and policy-
making, the Board considered a wide variety of topics.
3.3 On the technical side the Board provided a means for relating the
work of the different divisions, and for relating the program of the Laboratory
to other Manhattan District activities. It heard reports of the latest
nuclear calculations and measurements, and on the basis of these set basic
specifications for Ordnance and Chemistry. As experimental and design data
became available from Ordnance, the Board set fabrication requirements for
the metallurgists to meet.
-31
.
3.4 The progress of procurement and production was frequently reviewed,
particularly of active materials and separated isotopes needed in the
program. The Board supervised the liaison with other project laboratories
on these and related matters.
3.5 For the first eight months perhaps two-thirds of the Governing
Board?s time was devoted to lay matters. Frequent topics were housing,
construction and construction priorities, transportation, security restrictions,
personnel procurement, morale, salary scales, and promotion policy. In
most of these discussions, the Governing Board again provided a Link, here
between technical program and general administration.
3.6 The adversities of the first months are illustrated by a few very
minor items chosen at random. In the first meeting of March 30, 1943, it
was mentioned with some triumph that a calculating machine had finally been
obtained, on loan from the Berkeley Laboratory. The scarcity of transportation
is illustrated by the fact that a request for assignment of one pickup
truck was brought, for decision, as high as the Governing Board. In May,
the housing shortage was so serious that the Board took upon itself the assignment
of the six remaining apartments.
3.7 The membership of the Governing Board was: Bather, Bethe,
Kennedy, Hughes (3.20), Mitchell, Parsons (7.3), and Oppenheimer. Later
additions were McMillan, Kistiakows& (7.55), and Bainbridge (7.4).
3.8 A short time after the beginning of the Laboratory, a Coordinating
Council was established, whose membership was at the Group Leader level
or above. In contrast to the Governing Board, the Coordinating Council was
not a policy-making body, although at times policy problems were delegated
to it; for example, the Coordinating Council was asked to establish criteria
for deciding which members of the Laboratory should be classed as staff
members with unrestricted access to classified information. Its meetings
were generally informative rather than deliberative, consisting of reports of
an administrative and technical character. Since its members were the
heads of operating groups and were collectively in contact with all members
of the Laboratory, it served also as a vehicle of general opinion concerning
technical, administrative, and -on occasion -community affairs.
3.9 Divisions and groups, in turn, held their own regular meetings
and seminars. These, together with informal discussions and regularly published
reports, were the main vehicles of technical information in the Laboratory.
3.10 There was, finally, a weekly Colloquium which all staff members
were privileged to attend. Staff members, as distinguished from other
.
.
-32
.
-.
Laboratory employees, were defined as those with scientific degrees or
equivalent training in the field of their work, and therefore presumed capable
of giving or receiving benefit in general discussions of the technical program.
The Colloquium was less a means of providing information than an institution
which contributed to the viability of the Laboratory, to maintaining the sense
of common effort and responsibility.
3.11 Among all these channels of communication the Colloquium raised
the most serious question of policy. From a narrowly technical point of
view it was the least easy to justify; on the side of military security it appeared
to present the greatest hazard. Regular attendance would give any
staff member a generally complete and accurate picture of the problems and
progress of the Laboratory. Just this, however, was its purpose. Any essential
withholding of scientific information from the Colloquium would have
defeated this purpose, and would have represented a compromise of basic
policy. In practice, the relatively scientific and academic tone of Colloquium
discussions made it possible to avoid mention of many matters of relatively
small scientific, and relatively great tactical, value; where this was not possible
the tactical value of information was sometimes lessened by omission
of quantitative details. Despite these qualifications it remains true that the
policy adopted concerning communication represented a considerable departure
from the customs normally surrounding the protection of military secrets.
LIAISON
3.12 The last organizational problem, establishment of liaison, presented
somewhat unusual difficulties, reflecting the complexity of Manhattan
District organization. As the reviewing committee had pointed out (1.83), it
was important that some machinery be established for the interchange of
pertinent information between this and other branches of the project. The
isolation of Los Alamos even from other branches of the project was a basic
policy of the Manhattan District. Apparently it was difficult to separate the
virtues of this isolation from its vices: the needed liaisons were achieved
to any extent only after the most earnest representations.
3.13 The procedure established in June 1943 for liaison with the Metallurgical
Laboratory at Chicago is fairly typical. Permission was given for
the exchange of information by correspondence between specified representatives
of the two projects or by visits of the Los Alamos representatives to
Chicago. Information was restricted to chemical, metallurgical, and certain
nuclear properties of fissionable and other materials. It was permissible
-33
for the representatives to discuss schedules of need for and availability of
experimental amounts of U235and PU239. No information could be exchanged
on the design or operation of production piles, the design of weapons, or to
permit comparison of schedules of need for and availability of production
amounts of active materials. Three members of the Los Alamos Laboratory
were to be kept informed of the time estimates for production of large
amounts of these materials. k addition to the above, it was agreed that
special permission would be granted by the office of General Groves for
visits to Chicago by other members of this Laboratory to discuss specific
matters.
3.14 As the program developed, a number of topics were of great interest
to the workers at Los Alamos. Information was needed on the results
of chemical and metallurgical research at the Metallurgical Laboratory and
at the University of California and Iowa State College. This work was concerned
with the chemistry and metallurgy of uranium and plutonium and
methods for the analysis of impurities in these substances. Mormation was
needed on results of nuclear research at the Argonne Laboratories at Chicago.
It was important to know when materials would become available from
the production plants at Oak Ridge (Site X), the form in which the material
would be received, and the processing which it would have undergone. It was
also essential to know the analytical procedures to be used by the production
plants in determining the impurities and active content of this material.
3.15 The need for careful information on time schedules of production
was the most urgent and difficult part of this problem. The estimates received
during the first summer of the Laboratory were vague, incomplete,
and contradictory, so that it was difficult to make sensible schedules of
bomb research and development. The Governing Board in fact said that with
the existing state of information scheduling was impossible, and that unnecessary
delays would certainly result from this kind of blind operation. It was
strongly urged by the Board that Los Alamos maintain a fuI1-time representative
at Oak Ridge. An agreement was finally reached in November 1943,
by which Oppenheimer was permitted to visit the production plants at Oak
Ridge. When material began to arrive at Los Alamos in the spring of 1944,
the situation improved somewhat of itself.
3.16 The need for getting information required by the Ordnance and
Engineering Division presented special difficulties. Most of this information
had to be sought in agencies outside the Manhattan District. Knowledge of
the purpose and even the existence of Los Alamos had to be concealed from
them. Many devices were used: blind addresses, a Denver telephone number,
NDRC identification cards. The office of Dr. Tolman, Vice-Chairman
of NDRC, was instrumental in obtaining reports for this Laboratory on such
.
-34
.
.
subjects as gun-design, armor plating, explosives, detonators, bomb damage,
etc. The liaison with Army and Navy Ordnance, and with the Army Air
Force, will be discussed later (7.67ff and Chapter XIX).
3.17 Among the more troublesome and less obvious liaison needs were
those required with the University of California and within Los Alamos itself.
Although the work was to be carried out under a more or less standard type
of War Department contract, the University of California was, in matters of
policy, virtually unrepresented at the site. Security regulations and practices
were such, moreover, that its officers were excluded from discussions
of technical and administrative policy, and were allowed to concern themselves
almost exclusively with a rather narrow range of legal and contractual
affairs. At the Los Alamos site there were two administrative offices,
that of the military and that of the Laboratory. Even though the division of
labor was defined in a general way, most of the difficulties of dual organization
had to be lived through before effective cooperation was established.
Because of security policy, the officers charged with administering the community
and post were for the most part in ignorance of the Laboratory ~s
work. Thus, although the Manhattan District was the basic organization in
the DSM project, its local military representatives were excluded from the
sphere of Laboratory policy. Added to these difficulties, and complicated by
them, were the troubles of life in an isolated and unpractised community.
3.18 Under such circumstances a very great administrative burden fell
upon the shoulders of the Director. Whereas his primary responsibility was
the success of the scientific program, it was equally his concern that this
success not be jeopardized by extraneous difficulties. The administrative recommendations
of the Reviewing Committee had been aimed principally at improving
this situation. Apart from the specific difficulties of the procurement
off ice, the committee ~s main concern had been the need to improve relations
between the Laboratory and the Post Administration, and to relieve the Director
of as many nontechnical administrative responsibilities as possible. At
the beginning, the job of operating the project was taken over by a temporary
organization of scientific staff members ahd technicians. The important thing
was to avoid delay in research work. In the way stomi a host of small problems:
transportation, warehousing, procurement, planning of laboratory construction,
and housing. The enthusiasm with which these jobs were undertaken
was notable, as was the esprit that developed in the process. There was in it,
nevertheless, an element of antagonism between the Laboratory and the military
organization. However justified or unjustified this antagonism may in
particular cases have been on either side, it set a general problem for the future.
For those who have lived through the course of the project, what stands
out is not this initial element of conflict, which only reflected the diversity of
-35
American life, but the fact that through common purpose and by the measure
of actual accomplishment, this conflict was reduced to secondary importance.
.
3.19 The members of the staff were considerably heartened by a letter
which Oppenheimer read at a colloquium early in July. The letter dated
June 29, 1943, was from President Roosevelt and said, in part: "I wish YOU
would express to the scientists assembled with you my deep appreciation of
their willingness to undertake the tasks which lie before them in spite of
the dangers and the personal sacrifices. I am sure we can count on their
continued wholehearted and unselfish labors. Whatever the enemy may be
planning, American science will be equal to the challenge. With this thought
in mind, I send this note of confidence and appreciation.!'
3.20 Apart from the business and procurement offices, the administrative
organization of the Laboratory had only two officers other than the Director.
These were E. U. Condon of Westinghouse Research Laboratories, and
W. R. Dennes of the University of California. Of these, neither had fully determined
to remain with the Project, and both did in fact leave, Condon in
My, and Dennes in July of 1943. The reviewing committee had recommended
the appointment of an associate director, and of an administrative officer to
coordinate nontechnical administrative functions and to act as liaison with the
Post Administration. It was possible to fill neither position at the time. Certain
urgent requirements were met, however, by the appointment of new administrative
off icers. David Hawkins of the University of California came in
May 1943 to take the position of liaison with the Post Administration. D. L.
Hughes, Chairman of the Department of Physics, Washington University, St.
Louis, Missouri, was made Personnel Director in June. B. E. Brazier, formerly
of the T. H. Buell Company, Denver, came to the site in MA.yto take
charge of construct on and maintenance. In January 1944, David Dow of the
legal firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft, New York, was appointed Assistant
to the Director, in charge of nontechnical administrative matters.
3.21 By July 1944, the Administration of the Laboratory was organized
into the following groups:
A-1 Office of Director D. DOW
A-2 Personnel Office C. D. Shane (Assistant Director)
A-3 Business Office J. A. D. Muncy
A-4 Procurement Office D. P. Mitchell (Assistant Director)
A-5 Library, Document Room,
Editor
C. Serber, D. Inglis
A-6
Health Group Dr. L. H. Hempelmann
Maintenance J. H. Williams
Patent Office Major R. C. Smith
-36
Personnel Administration
.
3.22 The administration of the Laboratory was faced at the beginning
with a conflict of form and content. Because of the newness of large-scale
organized research, there does not exist for it a class of professional sci-
entific administrators. In the main a choice had to be made between a large
administrative organization staffed with persons unacquainted with the peculiarities
of scientific research, and a system by which the major share of
administrative responsibility fell to the scientists themselves. Here again
as with the engineering program it was partly a matter of expediency and
partly of policy that the center of gravity remained in the scientific staff.
The policy adopted meant, especially at the beginning, a gain of unity in the
Laboratory. It entailed, undeniably, a loss of administrative efficiency.
3.23 The Personnel Office, in particular, illustrates these remarks.
The Director, Hughes, was a physicist with administrative experience as
Chairman of the Department of Physics, Washington University. The organization
of the Laboratory was such that the Personnel Office was almost entirely
dependent upon the representations of Divisions and Group Leaders.
3.24 Apart from its connection with the Divisions and Groups of the
Laboratory in matters of employment and salary, the Personnel Office had
charge of a Santa Fe office of the Laboratory (for receiving and employment),
and of the Housing Office at the site. Under its jurisdiction fell personnel
security, draft deferment, placement of military personnel assigned to the
Laboratory, and certain miscellaneous matters. Although the scope of the
present history does not include the affairs of the Los Alamos Community,
the Laboratory became administratively involved in a number of these particularly
when, through their effects on the morale of the Laboratory
staff, they had a bearing upon the success of the work. Although these
matters were not all under the direction of the Personnel Office, they belong
by their content to the present section.
HOUSING AND OTHER COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
3.25 One of the most urgent community problems at the beginning was
the construction and organization of a school for the children of Los Alamos
residents. There had been at the old Los Alamos Ranch School a small
public elementary school for the children of its employees. In view of the
Laboratory's small original size it was believed that the old building would
-37
be adequate for the project's elementary school, and that a high school could
be established, making use of another of the original LOS Alamos buildings.
This plan soon proved unfeasible, and a school committee was appointed by
the Director and the Commanding Officer, Col. J. M. Harmon, succeeded
shortly thereafter by Lt. Col. Whitney Ashbridge. The committee made plans
for a school building, and supervised the planning of curriculum and employment
of teachers. The committee employed W. W. Cook of the University of
Minnesota as consultant. A building to house the elementary and high schools
was designed by Cook and Brazier. Construction was begun late in the summer
of 1943, and by virtue of a high construction priority was completed in
time for the opening of a fall school term. The committee was continued as
a school board.
3.26 The elementary and high schools were operated as free public
schools, salaries and procurement expenses being borne by the Government
through the contractor. A nursery school, for which a building had been
provided in the original plan of construction, was operated on a partially
self-supporting basis. This school made possible the part-time, or more
rarely full-time, employment of women with young children. In this case
the financial deficit was also carried by the Government.
3.27 Another matter in which the Laboratory administration was interested
was that of community representation in the civil affairs of Los
Alamos. III June 1943, a ~'Community Council" was established and its members
elected by popular vote. This superseded an earlier appointed committee.
It was intended to be purely advisory in its function. In its first form
it was a body elected only by the members of the Laboratory and their wives,
and did not represent the entire community. It was advisory, not to the
Commanding Officer, but to the Laboratory administration. In August 1943
a more representative council was approved by the new Commanding Officer,
Lt. Col. Whitney Ashbridge, and the Laboratory Director. This council met
with representatives of the Laboratory and the Commanding Officer. The
Council was regarded by some as a thorn in the side of the community administration.
At times it was. The council sought, however, to guide its
deliberations and recommendations by the single standard of the success of
the project. Sometimes its recommendations could not be carried out be
cause of limitations of manpower and material. Sometimes the limitations
derived from the customs of army administration. On the other hand many
recommendations were accepted. Under the guidance of the council a system
of small community play areas were built for the children of the Post.
Traffic laws were written with the advice of the council, which also acted as
a traffic court under a voluntary fine system. Other topics frequently considered
were: the operation of post exchange, messes, commissary, milk
supply, maid service, public transportation, and hospital.
3.28 A major community problem, which dogged and in many ways
hampered the Laboratory from the beginning, was housing. Los A.lames was
originally conceived as a small community of research scientists, more or
less stationary in character, whereas in fact it developed into a large and
complex industrial laboratory. Much of this development could not be foreseen,
coming as it did from self-development of the research program. The
housing problem was such as to put a constant drag upon the efforts of the
Laboratory to get and keep an adequate staff.
3.29 Construction at Los Alamos was not easy. Growth of population
strained power and water supplies. Construction was expensive of critical
manpower and materials; the presence of a large group of construction
workers put a further strain on community facilities. These difficulties,
moreover, plus a constantly shortening period of amortization, necessitated
corresponding cheapening of construction. To the shortage of housing, therefore,
was added a troublesome inequality.
3.30 The drag upon Laboratory expansion caused by the difficulties of
maintaining an adequate rate of housing construction is illustrated by the
fact that it was twice necessary, and a third time almost necessary, to make
use of outside housing facilities. It has been mentioned that at the very beginning
of the project members of the Laboratory had to be housed temporarily
in nearby !guest ranches. ~! By the beginning of summer, 1943, the
original housing accommodations were filled, and new housing was not yet
provided. For the period of June 19 to October 17, therefore, the project
acquired from the Park Service, and operated Frij oles Lodge at the Frijoles
Canyon headquarters of the Bandelier National Monument, fourteen miles
from Los Alamos. After its acquisition for the purpose by the Albuquerque
District Engineers, Frijoles was operated under the jurisdiction of the Personnel
Office. For this purpose the Laboratory obtained the services of
S. A. Butler, Assistant Manager of La Fonda, Santa Fe, who later became
Assistant Personnel Director. Frijoles Lodge was used again from July 17
to August 5, 1944, when the project faced another critical housing shortage.
3.31 Another facility in which the Laboratory had an administrative
interest was the community hospital. This hospital was operated for the
benefit of military and civilian personnel at Los Alamos, under the jurisdiction
of the Chief of the Medical Section of the Manhattan District. The
existence and excellent record of this hospital was an important contribution
to project morale. Another important function of the hospital was its cooperation
with the health and safety program of the Laboratory, whose work
is discussed in detail in a later section (3.87ff).
-39
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
3.32 It would be difficult to exaggerate the security precautions that
were taken at the beginning of the project, particularly in connection with
personnel. During the early period, moreover, the administration of security
policy was a matter of importance not only in safeguarding information, but
also because of the effects of restriction on morale, and the possibility that
serious breaches of security might lead to the imposition of even more
stringent external control.
3.33 Formal clearance of personnel for work on the project was arranged
through the Intelligence Officer stationed at the site. This procedure
was slow and cumbersome, especially in the first months. lh September
1943, a plan was approved to supplement clearance where necessary by an
interlocking system of vouching for the loyalty and good faith of the members
of the Laboratory.
3.34 The administration of security matters pertaining to Laboratory
personnel and their families was delegated to Hawkins as Contractor's security
agent, with the assistance of a security committee composed of himself,
Manley, and Kennedy, meet ing with the Intelligence Officer.
3.35 Recurring topics of discussion in the security committee were
the pass and badge system, the monitoring of the Laboratory for classified
material left unattended, the means of preventing classified discussions in
the presence of outsiders, the publication and revision of security regulations.
3.36 The most irksome restrictions placed on the Laboratory staff
were those affecting personal freedom. Travel outside a limited local area
and any contact with acquaintances outside the project were forbidden except
on Laboratory business or in cases of personal emergency. In the main
these restrictions were accepted as concessions to the general policy of
isolation. A small group thought they were not strict enough, and no one
was satisfied with the working definitions of flpersonal emergency. M The
removal of these restrictions in the fall of 1944 was a cause of general relief
after a year and a half of extreme restriction. Another feature of the
security policy of Los Alamos was censorship of mail. This was unusual in
itself, and amusing in the circumstance from which it began, namely, the
suspicion of unannounced tens orship. Not long after the Laboratory began,
this suspicion spread as a rumor. A certain amount of evidence that letters
had been opened was presented, varying considerably in quality. Once started,
such a rumor would no doubt have spread in any case. The Director, who
was in no position to guarantee that such censorship was not occurring, made
.
-40
strong representations to the office of General Groves. An investigation
was instituted by General Groves, which brought a negative result. Under
the circumstances, however, it was urged by n-any members of the Labo
ratory that official censorship be instituted and this was done in December
1943. Once begun, censorship did serve as a deterrent to the inadvertent
spreading of information about the project, of a sort which might contribute
to consistent rumors and continuing public interest in its activities. Cen
sorship was carried on by a standard military censorship office located in
Santa Fe, under the direction and with the advice of the Intelligence Officer,
Captain P. de Silva.
SALARY POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION
3.37 The most pressing problem of personnel administration in the
early months of the Laboratory was that of salaries. Salaries for scientific
employees were determined by either of two standards. One standard was
the OSRD scale, based upon scientific degrees held and number of years
since their conferment. The other was the 'ho loss no gain" principle, with
provision that individuals from academic positions, whose salaries are normally
based on a ten-month year, be paid at twelve-tenths their previous
rate. One source of difficulty was that men from industry had received a
higher rate of pay than those from academic positions. Another was that
technicians, men without academic degrees but often with considerable technical
skill, had to be employed at the prevailing rates in this labor market.
Although technicians ranked below the yourger professional scientists, they
often received higher salaries. A final difficulty was that a general commitment
had been made to a policy of length of service and merit increases,
but that no administrative mechanism existed to implement it.
3.38 The first major responsibility of Hughes, upon his arrival in
June 1943, was to prepare a set of recommendations on salary policy, based
upon a survey of this and other comparable laboratories. This statement of
policy proposed within the regulations of the National War Labor Board a
salary scale for the various classes of Laboratory employees, and a plan
for wage and salary increases. According to this plan the younger scientists
would be employed at a rate determined by the OSRD scale previously followed,
and their rate of salary increase determined accordingly. No provision
was made for increase of salaries above $400 per month, which were
virtually frozen.
.
3.39 The proposed salary scale and schedule of increases was presented
-41
for approval to the Manhattan District and the University of California in
June. Approval was, however, postponed. A further effort to obtain approval
was made in October and again in December. At this time it was learned
that certain formal changes had to be made because of changes in national
policy. After appropriate modifications had been made, approval was further
postponed until January, when a conference was held on the subject at Los
Alamos. Approval was finally granted February 2, 1944, after a year of
operation. During this period no system of promotion was possible, although
the proposed policy was followed in determining the salaries of individuals
newly hired.
3.40 The chief difficulty in matters of salary increase and promotion
concerned the younger scientific group who had been hired under the OSRD
scale. This scale, being based on length of time since conferment of academic
degrees , made provision for an annual salary increase, which however
would not be approved by the Contracting Officer, Lt. Col. S. L. Stewart, in
the absence of an approved Laboratory salary policy. Inequities, as measured
by the degree of responsibility and usefulness of various individuals,
were numerous both within this OSRD group and between it and those who
had been employed on a 'wo loss no gain" basis.
3.41 Final agreement
end of the war, but improvem(3.56ff) at which time a new
about salary policy
ent resulted from
working agreement
was
a rewas
not reached
organization
reached.
until thin July
e
1944
DRAFT DEFERMENT
3.42 The Laboratory policy of draft deferment reflected its general
personnel and security policies. Because of the absolute scarcity of trained
scientists and technicians in the United States during the war years, every
effort had to be made to prevent induction of men in these categories whose
services were essential and satisfactory. It was desirable from the standpoint
of security that the turnover of such personnel be kept at an absolute
minimum. On the other hand, the requirements of secrecy made it impossible
to give Selective Service any real information concerning the nature
and importance of the Laboratory ~s program, or of the work of an individual.
The average age of scientific and technical employees, moreover, was under
thirty, which placed the great majority in the draft-vulnerable category.
(See Graph 1 in the appendix section.)
3.43 Because of the very importance of the project, paradoxically,
deferment of Laboratory employees was a matter of some complexity.
Dennes came to the Laboratory empowered to act in deferment matters as
representative of the University War Council. The position was later assumed
by Hawkins. By the time of his departure Dennes had rescued relations
with Selective Service from the confusion unavoidable in the first
days of Laboratory organization.
3.44 The most essential Selective Service liaisons were with the New
Mexico State Director of Selective Service and the Selective Service Agencies
of the Manhattan District. From the former the Laboratory enjeyed the utmost
cooperation in all matters pertaining to Selective Service rules and policies,
and their interpretation. From the Selective Service Office of the Manhattan
District and from the Washington Liaison Office the Laboratory received the
greatest consideration in difficult individual cases.
3.45 Most developments in draft deferment procedure were only technical
and did not reflect a change of policy. As the war progressed and the
needs of the Army and Navy increased, deferment requirements became more
stringent. The Laboratory therefore depended increasingly upon official certification
of its needs by the Manhattan District. In February 1944, the War
Department adopted a policy forbidding the deferment of men under 22 years
of age in the employ of the Department or its contractors. There was in
the Laboratory a small but highly trained and essential group under 22.
Under the circumstances they could not be deferred. When these men were
inducted, therefore, there was no choice but to have them reassigned to the
Laboratory as members of the Special Engineer Detachment.
PERSONNEL PROCURE MENT
3.46 Some mention has been made in Chapter I of the difficulties in
staffing the original Los Alamos Laboratory, Its subsequent growth, moreover,
was such that the working population doubled, on the average, about
every nine months. Although a declining proportion of new employees were
of scientific staff classification, the absolute number increased month by
month until almost the end of the war. (See Graph 2.) At the same time
the difficulty of finding competent scientists increased. The difficulty was
greatest in the upper technician and junior scientist brackets. Senior scientists
were needed in small numbers, and were usually well known to members
of the Laboratory. They were, in many cases, anxious to join the
Laboratory, and releases from less critical work, or in some cases from
other Manhattan Projects, could be obtained through the efforts of the Washington
Liaison Office. Junior men were needed in great numbers; recruiting
trips to universities, however, were impossible because of security regulations.
In November 1943, the assistance of Dean Samuel T. Arnold of Brown
University was obtained in these matters. An arrangement was also made
with M. H. Trytten of the National Roster of Scientific and Technical Personnel
by which he could spend a part of his time visiting universities and
employing young scientific personnel for the Laboratory. Trytten was of
assistance to the Laboratory for a period of several months. Arnold remained
as liaison in Washington in personnel matters throughout the course
of the project.
MILITARY PERSONNEL
3.47 A small number of officers of the Army and Navy with scientific
training were obtained at various times for work in the Laboratory. The
largest group of military personnel in the Laboratory came, however, from
the Women's Army Corps, and as enlisted men in the Special Engineer Detachment
(SED). The latter detachment was originally established as a small
detachment (about 300 for all Manhattan projects) in which men essential to
the work of the Manhattan District could be placed in cases where deferments
were no longer possible. At a time when junior scientific personnel were
extremely difficult to find (November 1943), the Laboratory was informed
that a group of new graduates of the Army Specialized Training Program
would be available at the beginning of the year and could be assigned to the
Laboratory in the SED.
3.48 Although it remained the basic policy of the Laboratory that its
work should be carried out on a civilian basis, it had become clear that
young civilians, of the type most urgently needed, were increasingly difficult
to find. They were in fact being rapidly inducted into the Army, where in
many cases their assignment would be less appropriate to their training than
if they were transferred to the SED. The inconsistency and potential personnel
difficulties involved in obtaining these men were fully appreciated. lh
view, however, of the Selective Service policy that resulted in the induction
of many men from essential fields already seriously undermanned, there was
no choice but to welcome into the Laboratory all technically trained enlisted
personnel for whom civilian counterparts could not be found. From a tabulation
made in May 1945, it was found that 29 per cent of all SED personnel
held college degrees, including several Doctor and Master degrees. Most of
the degrees were in the fields of Engineering, Chemistry, Physics, and Mathematics.
(See Graphs 2, 3 and 4.)
.
-44
3.49 In the case of the WAC detachment also, several competent scientists
were obtained, as well as a larger number of technical and office
workers. (See Graph 4.)
3.50 The personnel policy regarding enlisted men and women was in
essence identical with that for civilians, with obvious adjustments. After
arrival at the site and assignment to the Laboratory, all further matters of
placement, job classification, transfer, and promotion within the Laboratory
were under the jurisdiction of the Laboratory Personnel Office.
3.51 The establishment and rapid growth of the SED at Los Alamos
brought a number of administrative problems connected with the morale,
accommodations, and working conditions of the group. The most serious
problem arose from the shortage of multiple unit housing, which made it
impossible for the Post Administration to provide quarters for married enlisted
men. Further, Major P. de Silva objected to the hiring (except as
nurses) of the wives of enlisted men, although they could have been quartered
in the dormitories for women workers on the project. Also security regulations
made it impossible for them to bring their wives to Santa Fe or
other nearby communities. Security restrictions against travel and association
with persons away from the project worked therefore a very much
greater hardship on enlisted personnel than on civilians, whose wives and
children lived at Los Alamos.
3.52 Another problem was created by the fact that military promotions,
which were the responsibility of the SED Commanding Officer, were also the
only material means available for recognition of responsibility and excellence
in technical work. The SED Table of Organization permitted promotion of
one-third of the men to each of the grades T/3, T/4, T/5, with the provision
that about one-tenth of those in T/3 could be promoted to the ranks of Technical
and Master Sergeant. Since the great majority of the men arrived with
a rank no greater than T/5, there was, at least in the first period, ample
opportunity for promotion. The ground for and rate of promotion had, however,
to be agreed upon between the SED Commanding Officer and the Uboratory,
and for several months no such policy was firmly established or
consistently followed.
3.53 A third difficulty arose from the conflict of military and technical
duties. Although the official hours of work in the Laboratory were eight
hours a day for six days a week, it was the practice of many groups in the
.-
Laboratory, particularly research groups, to work more irregular and usually
much longer hours. This practice created conflict with barracks duties and
formations.
-45
3.54 The presence of other detachments (engineer and military p~lice)
required some consistency of treatment of the military personnel in accordance
with the usual military organization. However, a number of steps were
taken which improved the position of the SED, although they did not entirely
solve its problems. In June 1944, general supervision of the ndlitary administration
of SED matters was given to Major P. de Silva. As Intelligence
Officer his work brought him into close connection with the Laboratory Administration.
In August, the regulation forbidding travel and outside social
contact was relaxed for military personnel in the Laboratory so that they
might visit their wives and families on furlough. In August, also, Major
T. O. Palmer was appointed Commanding Officer of the SED. A large part
of the credit in maintaining SED morale under difficult conditions must be
given to Major Palmer. A system of promotion recommendations by Group
and Divisions was soon worked out which was satisfactory to him and to the
Laboratory administration. The problem of conflicting duties was not and
perhaps could not be solved adequately. The amount of overtime work done
by many groups and individuals required essentially civilian conditions of life.
CONCLUSION
3.55 The Laboratory personnel department found itself confronted by
an unusually broad range of difficulties. To the problems of a peacetime
urban laboratory were added those of a special military and civilian community,
the whole being complicated by a corresponding duality of jurisdiction.
3.56 The greatest single difficulty was undoubtedly that of salary
policy. The facts as stated are by no means self-explanatory. As the matter
appeared to those charged with personnel responsibilities at Los Alamos,
the underlying reasons for these difficulties were somewhat as follows: The
Laboratory did not enter the scene as a going concern, such as would have
been the case with a large contracting corporation or a university operating
with its own staff in its own plant. The University of California was, on the
contrary, remote from the concrete problems of Laboratory administration.
Both the general salary policy and its detailed administration, moreover,
were under the supervision and subject to the direct veto of the Contracting
Officer, Lt. Col. Stewart. He, however, on whom the responsibility devolved,
found it impossible, because of his situation, to discharge it to the satisfaction
of the Laboratory. He was stationed in Los Angeles where his services
were urgently needed in connection with procurement matters (3.78): he had
only general and over-alI acquaintance with the problems of the Laboratory.
Either of two conditions would have remedied the situation: (1) that the
.
-
-46
Laboratory have a strong, well-organized personnel office, capable of repre senting
its need with sufficient consistency, detailed justification, and vigor
to compensate for the Contracting Officer ?s remote position; or (2) that the
Contacting Officer be stationed at Los Alamos, where he would be in a
position to understand the detailed needs of the Laboratory (cf 3.17, 3.22).
As matters finally developed, it was the partial satisfaction of both conditions
that tended to solve the Laboratory!s salary problems.
3.57 In fact, by June 1944 it was apparent that a considerable administ
rative reorganization was necessary. Hughes' previous experience and
Los Alamos function had been primarily in the building of a competent scientific
Laboratory staff. The rapid expansion of the Laboratory and its
ramification in many directions not covered by the term ~Yesearchl ? created
personnel problems of a new and different order. After a year spent in
building up the scientific staff of Los Alamos and seeking to formulate and
work out its personnel policies under increasingly difficult conditions, Hughes
returned to his previous position at Washington University. His position was
taken by C. D. Shane of the Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley. As his general
assistant Shane brought Roy E. Claus en of the University of California.
Armand Kelly, formerly at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University
of Chicago was brought as an expert in matters of salary and salary control.
Hawkins, who had until this time been only loosely connected with the Per
sonnel Office, was made responsible under Shane for draft deferment and for
military personnel matters.
3.58 The most serious personnel problem at this time was still that
of salaries. After reviewing the situation in the Laboratory in June, Shane
had accepted the position as Personnel Director with the understanding that
in matters of salary cent rol he and his office would have a reasonable degree
of autonomy, not subject to veto by the Contracting Officer except in
terms of Federal salary policy and regulations. As was stated above, an
agreement with the Contracting Officer to this effect was reached in July 1944.
Other Administrative Functions
BUSINESS OFFICE
3.59 In February 1943, shortly before the administration of the Laboratory
moved to Santa Fe, the University of California appointed J. A. D.
Muncy as Business Mimager for the Laboratory. His responsibilities included
-47
all the normal activities of a business office, but security restrictions put
quirks into its operations and added a number of unusual functions. For
security reasons it had already been decided to locate the Purchasing Office
in Los Angeles (1.12). It was considered desirable to have the Accounting
Office physically connected with the Purchasing Office. For this reason a
general business office in Los Angeles for the most part took over operations
from the Business Office at the point where money was disbursed. Complete "
records of all transactions were kept in that office, and government and universit
y audits were made there. Jn practice, however, a small account maintained
in the Santa Fe bank for emergency purchases, travel advances, and
for cashing personal checks for Contractor!s employees reached considerable
proportions. It was, in fact, the second largest account in the bank, and
since it was in Muncy~s name, he frequently received circulars from charitable
organizations suggesting large contributions.
3.60 The l'normal" functions of the Business Office were payroll control,
issuance of travel advances and preparation of travel expense bills,
procurement of materials on the emergency purchases fund, maintenance of
records for workmen!s compensation and for the California State Employees 1
Retirement System, to which employees of the University were obliged to
contribute after six months of employment.
3.61 Scientific workers were not permitted to maintain accounts in
the local bank to avoid giving the bank a list of Laboratory personnel. This
rule was maintained for all monthly salaried employees. The Business Office
at the site therefore made up the monthly payroll and forwarded it to the
Los Angeles office where checks were written and mailed to the banks designated
by the employees. However, in 1943 the Contractor employed a large
group of laborers and construction workers who were paid on an hourly basis,
and beginning in January 1945 the salaries of machinists and other shop
workers were computed on an hourly basis. These payrolls were made up
and checks written by the Business Office at Los Alamos. Approximate
monthly payroll figures of $50,000, $160,000 and $175,000 for the months
of June 1943, 1944, and 1945, respectively, indicate the tremendous growth
of the staff of the project. The payroll for hourly workers in June 1943 was
roughly $ 23,000; in June 1945 it was approximately $130,000. The figure for
1944 is negligible, covering substitute school teachers and some part-time
clerical workers. (See Graph 2.)
3.62 In keeping payroll records at the site there was considerable
difficulty with accurate records of attendance. The university procedure of
having a supervisor certify monthly that all employees in his charge were
present with the exceptions noted was not considered adequate by the Manhattan
District. On the other hand, certifications by the Group Leader as to
attendance by days and half-days was considered completely impractical by
the direction of the Laboratory for a number of reasons: personnel was too
scattered, particularly in those groups doing field work; scientific workers
frequently worked at night though not on regular shifts. Scientific workers
often worked a good deal more than 48 hours a week, and since the contract
did not allow for overtime payments it was felt that deductions for absences
could not reasonably be made. The only procedure used until September
1945 for the scientific and administrative staff was a negative report made
monthly by each employee, without any Group Leader certification. Although
this system was never considered satisfactory, it is probably true that a
more rigorous control would have imposed an almost prohibitive administrative
burden, and would have had an unfortunate effect on the morale of scientific
workers who were actually giving more than 48 hours a week to proj ect
work.
3.63 Reimbursement for travel on project business was handled in the
same rnanner as the payroll. Although advances were issued from the local
account, travel expense bills were forwarded to the Los Angeles office and
checks mailed from there to the bank of the payee.
3.64 The emergency purchases fund was used for materials for which
it was not practical to route the request through the Los Angeles Purchasing
Office, either because of the urgency of the request or because of the character
of the materials. The bulk of the material purchased on this fund in
1943 fell into the former category, since it was mostly construction supplies
needed immediately for work being done by the Contractor. The amount of
disbursements from this fund in June 1943 was approximately $23,000, and
in June 1944 it had dropped to $4,000. Jn the latter year the materials purchased
were principally batteries, dry ice, and cylinders of gas, items not
suitable for shipment from Los Angeles. In June 1945, during the preparations
for the Trini@ shot, some $38,000 were spent for miscellaneous items,
ranging from radio tubes to canvas water bags, plus an increased volume of
the normal batteries, gases, etc. Among the unusual purchases made with
this fund were 88 cows which apparently had suffered radioactive burns during
the Trinity test.
3.65 One of the first of the somewhat extraordinary duties of the
Business Office was handling the financial end of the temporary housing
mentioned in Chapter I. The cost of opening and operating the ranches used
made the expenses to employees considerably greater than they would have
been at the site. It was felt that the project should assume this extra cost,
since housing was not ready at the site as had been promised. The Contractor
therefore operated the ranches and billed each individual or head of family
for the amount of his living expenses at the site (rent plus $25 per month
-49
per person for food). In all, five ranches were operated from the end of
March to the end of May 1943 at a cost of some $7,000. Claims for damage
to the temporary housing occupied by Contractor ts personnel were also
settled by the Business Office, with the assistance of the Contracting Officer.
.
3.66 Other unusual functions of the Business Office stemmed for the
most part from the attempt to prevent a list of personnel accumulating outside
the project. Thus personnel were requested not to cash personal checks
in Santa Fe, and check cashing facilities were provided at Los Alamos. By
1945 the daily average of checks cashed was between $3,000 and $4,000.
All personal long distance calls and personaI telegrams were charged to a
Business Office account, and the daily telephone bill increased from $57 in
June 1943 to $745 in June 1944. When New Mexico income tax returns were
due, the Business Office assigned a number to each employee, and reported
to the income tax bureau the amount of income paid to that number in New
Mexico during the year. The employee then used his number instead of his
name on his return.
3.67 It can be seen from this brief account that the volume of work
handled by the Business Office grew considerably beyond what had been anticipated.
In spite of the limitation imposed by the availability of housing,
the staff increased to some 15 people by mid-1945. It is clear, however,
that the decision to keep the main accounting office in Los Angeles was a
wise one, both because of the advantage of proximity to the Purchasing Office,
and because its staff, which grew to some 70 people, would have required
a housing project all its own at Los Alamos.
3.68 Because security regulations made it impossible for personnel to
take out new life insurance and because of the extra-hazardous character of
the work done at the project, the problem of providing insurance for employees
proved extremely complex and was never adequately solved, although
a long series of efforts were made by the Director fs Office in cooperation
with the Business Office. When the project was organized, employees of the
technical area were covered by an OSRD health and accident policy, covering
injury, illness or death, placed with the Fidelity and Casualty Company of
New York. In September 1943 this policy was replaced by M2mhattan District
Master Policy 1 with the Sun Indemnity Company, which offered additional
benefits including extra-hazardous insurance. In July 1944 ~ster Policy 1
was replaced by Master Policy 2, with premiums to be paid by the individual
or the contractor rather than by the government. Master Policy 3 provided
for accidents not arising out of employment. At about this time there was
-.
considerable discussion of the fact that the extra-hazardous insurance policy
in effect for people working on radioactive substances was inadequate, since
no provision was made for the fact that injuries might not appear for 10 or
-50
15 years after they were received. Eventually this problem was solved in
part by a special arrangement made with the University of California. A
fund of $1,000,000 was deposited with the University by the Government to
be used for payment by the University with the consent of the Government
of up to $10,000 for injuries resulting from a number of specified extra-
hazards listed in a secret letter to the University. Statutory Workmen's
Compensation of the State of New Mexico was provided by the Contractor
for all persons assigned permanently to work in New Mexico. The total of
claims paid under Workmen ~s Compensation through December 1945 was
only $18,000, of which $12,000 covered death benefits for two laborers killed
in a motor vehicle accident in 1943. Accident policies, essentially the same
as Master Policies 2 and 3 which expired, were made available in September
1944 for purchase by individual employees. For some time there was no
coverage for travel on noncommercial, nonexperimental aircraft used by
project employees, but eventually this was covered by a personal accident
policy with Aero Insurance Underwriters for civilian employees.
PROCUREMENT'
3.69 The communit y's isolation created many problems but the most
acute and serious of these were faced by the Procurement Office. Supplying
a large research laboratory from the ground up is in itself a difficult task;
doing this secretly, in wartime, 1200 miles from the nearest large market
and 100 miles from the nearest rail and air terminal would appear to be an
impossible one. Yet the Procurement Office succeeded in overcoming all the
obstacles of time, space, and security, and in satisfying the exacting and apparently
insatiable demands of the laboratory. The fact that the Laboratory
was able to meet its tight time schedule is a tribute to the competence and
efficiency of its Procurement Office, guided from the beginning by D. P.
Mitchell of Columbia University.
3.70 In February 1943, Mitchell, Oppenheimer, and several other scientists
met with representatives of the Army and of the University of California
to discuss purchasing policies. At the insistence of the University, it
was agreed that all matte rs of purchasing and payments would be administered
directly by members of the University staff, and within their entire
discretion as to appointees but subject to the general supervision of the Contracting
Officer. In effect, this meant that while Mitchell was in charge of
ordering materials for the Laboratory, the actual purchasing would be done
by University appointees. This organizational complication brought with it
an additional security complication -the University's purchasing office would
-51
have to be located in Los Angeles, and its employees would not be permitted
to come to Los Alamos to deal directly with persons placing orders, or to
know anything about the work of the Laboratory.
3.71 At about this time, the basic policies which were to govern
Mitchell as Procurement Officer were outlined. He was to be guided primarily
by the necessity for speed and was not to be held responsible for
the kind or quality of items to be purchased. He was to be authorized to
place orders by requisitions signed by qualified members of the scientific
staff, such requisitions to show quantity, description of item, date required,
urgency, and suggested source. On the basis of the ordering individual ~s
statement of urgency, Mitchell would judge the degree of priority required,
and the means of communication and transportation to be used in order to
meet the delivery date. Primarily the policy of the Procurement Office was
to supply the needs of the technical staff as promptly as possible, and with
as little red tape as possible. On the whole, this policy was maintained
successfully.
3.72 A great many things had to be ordered before the Laborato~y
could begin to function, and until the Los Angeles Purchasing Office was
established, such purchases were made through the Purchasing Office of the
Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley.
3.'73 The Los Angeles office was organized by D. L. Wilt and was in
operation MArch 16, 1943. After September 1943, A. E. Dyhre was in charge
of this office. In early discussions about procurement it was proposed that
branch purchasing offices be established in New York and Chicago, to be
subordinate to the Los Angeles office. These were set up in ApriI 1943.
Except in cases of unusual emergency the Laboratory's Procurement Office
dealt directly only with the Los Angeles Office, either by mail or teletype.
Requisitions for items not readily available in the Los Angeles area were
forwarded to the New York and Chicago branches from Los Angeles. The
three offices together employed a total of about 300 at their peak, including
33 buyers and 22 expediters. An average monthly dollar volume was about
$400,000, covering an average of about 6,000 items purchased. However, in
the peak month (May 1945) these figures were over a million dollars for
more than 10,OOOitems. (See Graph 7.)
3.74 A certain amount of local purchasing was permitted. At first
f!~ocaltf was defined ss a radius of 500 miles including Denver, but as security
restrictions tightened, !!loca~!! was limited to a radius of 10() miles, including
Albuquerque. Originally local purchases were intended to satisfy
only emergency needs for items not obtainable in time through normal channels,
and authorization for such purchases had to be secured from the
..
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-.
Business Office. Later, however, local purchases became a regular function
of the Procurement Office, and included not only emergency items but also
many bulk items such as fuel and building supplies, which could be purchased
advantageously from local suppliers. In no case was it possible to place
items on back order or ask local vendors to place orders for the Laboratory.
For security reasons, purchases were made in Muncy fs name. The Post
Supply Section, under the able direction of Major Edward A. White, was frequently
called upon to supply various items for the Technical Area. A sys tern
was set up whereby the Technical Area could requisition on lfaj or
White's office and this channel of procurement was of no small help to the
technical work.
3.75 As has been mentioned before (1.17), the first groups of scientists
brought with them a cyclotron, a Van de Graaff generator, a Cockcroft-
Walton accelerator, and a certain amount of electronic equipment. Aside
from these things, there was nothing at Site Y to constitute a laboratory.
Most of the scientists had come from universities where they had fairly
well-equipped laboratories and stockrooms which had been building up supplies
in specialized fields for years. Within a few months, the Procurement
and Purchasing Offices had completely to equip physics, chemistry, and
electronics laboratories as well as machine shops, and also to prepare stockrooms
of supplies for these laboratories and shops. The range of materials
required for this task was incredibly great -everything from women ls work
clothes to 10-ton trucks. It has been stated, without exaggeration, that in
variety of items the requirements of this laboratory exceeded those of Bell
Laboratories, one of the largest research organizations in the world. The
Procurement Office bought such things as rats, meteorological balloons, sewing
machines, restaurant equipment, jeweller ~s tools, and washing machines
in addition to what might be considered standard items of shop and laboratory
equipment. At the time the Procurement Office for site Y was organized,
early in 1943, the nation 1s industry had been thoroughly converted to
war production. Stockpiles were running low in many items considered
standard for research laboratories but not important for any other wartime
use. Some things were almost completely unavailable; others could be secured
only with high priorities. Project Y was assigned AA-1 priority by
the War Production Board (WPB), but often it was necessary to request the
District's help in securing higher priority or a WPB directive for particular
items. The Procurement and Purchasing Offices succeeded in having equipment
on hand almost as soon as there were buildings to house the various
laboratories. Stockrooms were ready in short order -one for chemical
supplies -K stock, one for general laboratory supplies -S stock, one for
special electronic supplies, and one for each of the shops.
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3.76 Once the various laboratories were established, the task of the
Procurement Office became that of meeting the continuing demands of the
scientific and technical staff for equipment and keeping stockrooms adequately
supplied. Responsibility for the electronic and shop stockrooms was turned
over to the various operating groups. The duties of procurement could
never become routine, because of the Laboratory 1s continuous expansion and
because of the constant and necessary changes in the technical program.
Since the Laboratory was operating on a rigid time scale, time was always
the most critical factor, and shipping instructions made by the Procurement
Office on requisitions sent to the Purchasing Office were often extremely
important. Occasional failure of the Purchasing Office to carry out shipping
instructions precisely was one of the minor sources of friction between the
two offices. On several occasions the Procurement Office was obliged to
re-order by air express an item that was being shipped by freight contrary
to instructions. Waiting for freight delivery would have meant holding up
vital experiments that would cost much more in time and money than the
cost of duplicating an order.
3.77 Second only to time in importance was the question of security,
and this too caused innumerable difficulties to the Procurement and Purchasing
Offices. For security reasons Site Y was Iocated far from any
large city, and therefore separate purchasing offices had to be established
in marketing centers. For security reasons, the employees of these purchasing
offices could have no direct contact with the using groups at the
Laboratory, could know nothing about the work of the Laboratory, and therefore
could not understand its significance or appreciate the urgency and responsibility
of their own work. Employees of the Chicago and New York
offices dealt directly only with the Los Angeles office, except in emergencies.
For security reasons, using groups were almost never able to deal directly
with manufacturers and dealers; when questions about design or fabrication
arose, these questions had to be transmitted through the New York or Chicago
Purchasing Offices to the Los Angeles Purchasing Office, from there
to the Los Alamos Procurement Office, and finally to the using groups; the
answer had to be sent back along this same path to the supplier. For security
reasons no direct shipments could be made to Site Y; all suppliers
were instructed to ship goods to Chicago and Los AngeIes warehouses, from
where they had to be transshipped to Y with their original labels removed
in order to prevent unauthorized persons from learning what kinds of things
were being received. Originally the Los Angeles and Chicago warehouses
did nothing but transship orders, and the Site Y warehouse checked shipments
and approved invoices. Because of government regulations insisting upon
prompt payment of bills to avoid loss of discount, procedure was changed so
that invoices were checked against shipments at Los Angeles and Chicago
.
-.
.
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o
and approved there. This procedure led to minor difficulties: goods would
be received that were neither usable nor returnable, items would be missing
from the shipment but checked on the invoice, packages of photographic film
would be opened for inspection.
3.78 Periodically, technical groups in the Laboratory submitted criticisms
of the Los Angeles Purchasing Office to the Director, and periodically
the Director would transmit these criticisms to the appropriate Army and
University officials. The theme of most of these criticisms was that the
Los Angeles office was staffed by inefficient and inexperienced buyers. For
some time these offices were seriously understaffed, and some of these criticisms
may have been justified; on the whole, however, circumstances made
unavoidable much of the apparent inefficiency. The University and the Purchasing
Office maintained with considerable justice that much of their diffi culty
was directly traceable to the strict security regulations under which
they operated. Statistics compiled from time to time by the Contracting Officer,
Lt. Col. Stewart, on the efficiency of the Purchasing Office show fairly
commendable results. To some extent the criticisms of the Purchasing Office
by using groups in the Laboratory were caused by their isolation from
and unfamiliarity with the actual state of the market. They had come from
universities whose equipment had largely been purchased under peacetime
conditions, when time was not at a premium and manufacturers 1 catalogues
actually represented stock on hand. During the war many manufacturers
stopped publishing current catalogues, and those catalogues which were available
in no way represented existing conditions. Men had been in the habit
of designing apparatus, starting to build it, and then ordering parts they did
not have on hand. This habit nearly proved disastrous on several occasions.
For example, one group designed a special kind of camera to be used in
connection with the Trinity test, proceeded to work on construction, and ordered
necessary parts. After the work was well under way, the group was
notified that the particular lenses they had ordered were not on the market,
would have to be ground to order, and might not be ready in time to be useful.
Also, the particular kind of plate backs which they had incorporated
into the camera design were no longer available on the market and were not
being manufactured. Purchasing Offices scoured the country, and succeeded
in finding about one-third of the required number of plate backs. To secure
the rest, it was necessary through the Washington Liaison Office to get a
WPB directive ordering the former manufacturer of these items to stop his
current production and make the necessary amount for the Laboratory. The
cameras were ready in time for Trinity, but only after a tremendous expenditure
of effort by all concerned. Such incidents were not frequent, but
serve to illustrate some of the difficulties encountered by the Purchasing
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Office. From the very beginning, the Procurement Office had made an effort
to teach the using groups the importance of finding out about the availability
of certain materials before completing designs and starting work, but
it was difficult to change old habits and difficult for men to realize that a
small loss of time spent in studying the market might mean a large saving
of time in completing a satisfactory piece of equipment.
3.79 Just as the Laboratory groups were hampered by their unfamiliarity
with the state of the market, so the Purchasing Offices were hampered
by their unfamiliarity with the kind of work being done at the Laboratory.
Knowing nothing about the work, they could know nothing about the uses for
which partiouhzr items were needed, and therefore could not understand which
specifications were critical and which were simply listed for convenience.
A buyer in New York receiving an urgent request for some item ordinarily
made of metal might be notified by the manufacturer that other users were
accepting wartime substitutes made of plastic. The buyer would see no obvious
difficulty with this substitute -no reason to ask the Los Angeles office
to check with the Y office to check with the user -and would place the
order. He could not be expected to know that for the scientist ~s purpose,
size, color and shape were convenient but not indispensable, whereas the
chemical composition of the material was the one all-important criterion.
Such incidents occurred again and again, and the only possible solution was
to have members of the technical staff make their specifications as complete
and explicit as possible without revealing the nature of their work. The
local Procurement Office made a serious effort to have the using groups
prepare accurate and complete specifications, and the Procurement Office
itself checked such specifications closely before transmitting them to Los
Angeles.
3.80 The organization established at Y to handle some of the complex
problems outlined above was in itself rather simple. In accordance with its
policy of eliminating red tape and supplying the Laboratory as quickly and
efficiently as possible, Mitchell organized his department into two main
sections -Procurement, under the supervision of E. E. Olsen, and Service
and Supplies under the supervision of H. S. Alien. The Procurement Section
consisted at first of two groups, Buying and Records. Later a third -Property
Inventory -was added. The Buying Group was responsible for checking
specifications on purchase requests, suggesting a possible manufacturer or
vendor to the Los Angeles office, justifying high urgencies, and answering
questions initiated by the Los Angeles Purchasing Office. Essentially the
local buyers existed to give the Los Angeles buyers the information they required
to purchase the things needed at the Laboratory. The Records Group
was responsible for maintaining files of correspondence and purchase requests,
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..
and also Kardex files of expendable and nonexpendable goods on hand. When
one understands that for every purchase request an average of sixty pieces
of paper w involved, including printed forms and teletypes, the importance
of the Records Group becomes evident. The Kardex files were later transferred
to the Property Inventory Section (9.24). The Service and Supplies
section consisted of four groups -the stockrooms, receiving, shipping, and
records. Originally one man was in charge of all the stockrooms -the general
laboratory supply, the chemical supply, electronic, machine shop, and a
few small specialized supply rooms. The Receiving Group was responsible
for opening packages, identifying items with purchase orders, and directing
distribution either directly to Laboratory groups or to the appropriate stockroom.
The Records Group maintained files of purchase orders for follow up
purposes, files of stocks on hand, and various receiving record files.
3.81 Certain special procurement channels by-passed the University
Purchasing Office in Los Angeles. These concerned parts for the completed
bomb-mechanism, materials including uranium and plutonium coming from
other branches of the project, and materials obtained directly from the Army
or Navy such as electronic components and completed devices of an electronic
nature, guns, propellants, and high explosives.
LIBRARY AND DOCUMENT ROOM
3.82 One of the minor but extremely important groups in the Laboratory
was the Library. No research laboratory can exist without a library
well stocked with standard technical reference works, files of technical j ournals,
and reports of work in progress, especially when that laboratory is
isolated from all other universities and libraries. The Los Alamos library
served its purpose well, and was one of the few administrative groups in the
Laboratory about which there were substantially no complaints from the scientific
staff. The library was organized and directed by Charlotte Serber.
3.83 Like the Procurement Office, the Library faced the problem of
providing in a few months a comprehensive collection of books and journals
on physics, chemistry, engineering, and metallurgy that had taken other libraries
years to accumulate. A large part of this initial problem was solved
by loans, chiefly from the University of California library. A tentative list
of book requirements submitted by various staff members planning the laboratory
consisted of approximately 1200 books and 50 journals (complete files
from 1920 for the most part). Many of these were impossible to secure on
the market, but fortunately the University library was able to supply nearly
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all of the rare out-of-print titles. New publications were bought, but only
through a circuitous route, because of security restrictions. Orders from
.
the Los Alamos Library were sent to a forwarding address in Los Angeles,
and from there to the University library in Berkeley; from Berkeley, orders
were placed with book publishers and dealers to be sent to the Los Angeles
receiving warehouse, and from Los Angeles the books were forwarded to
Los Alamos. By July, 1945, the Library incIuded approximately 3,000 books,
160 journals per month, and 1500 microfilm reproductions of specific articles
and portions of books.
3.84 The largest part of the Library's work, however, was that of
reproducing and distributing reports of work in progress. For this purpose,
the Library staff included two small subgroups, known as the workshop and
the document room. The workshop typed, reproduced, and assembled technical
reports and manuals submitted by the various scientific groups of the
Laboratory. The workshop group collaborated very closely with the editorial
section and with the photography and photostating shop. Completed reports
were turned over to the document room for distribution in accordance with
security regulations, since nearly all of the work of the project was classified.
The Laboratory's guiding policy for distributing information among its
own workers was simply that in no case should information be withheld from
anyone who could work more effectively if information were in his hands, or
who would be in a better position to maintain a high level of security in his
possible dealings with outside workers if he were more fully informed. To
carry out this policy, the document room of the Library was supplied with a
list of personnel entitled to have access to all or certain categories of classified
documents, and this list was kept up to date by advice from group and
division leaders. lh general, comparatively few documents were distributed
to individuals; the majority were kept in the document room to be read there
or borrowed temporarily by qualified persons. In addition to maintaining a
complete and current file of Los Alamos reports, the document room kept a
file of documents received from other Manhattan District projects. Some
notion of the amount of work handled by the document room can be gained
from the fact that by January 1945 there were 6090 reports on file, exclusive
of extra copies of the same report, and that approximately 10 per cent of
the total circulated each week.
3.85 Among minor duties of the Library was that of instructing the
secretarial staff in the preparation of reports for reproduction, and the handling
of classified documents. In January 1945, the library document room
assumed from the Patent Office (3.123) the duty of issuing patent notebooks,
keeping a record of notebooks issued, and collecting them from individuals
upon separation from the project.
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,.
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EDITOR
i
3.86 From the beginning the Los Alamos Laboratory produced large
quantities of reports. Whole fields of research were amplified by the results
of work done here so that regularly published papers in these fields
were made obsolete, and reports written here became standard reference
works for this and other Manhattan District projects. It was therefore necessary
to have experimental results reported speedily and accurately in a
form that would be readily accessible to other employees requiring the information
for their own work. It soon became apparent that responsibility
for the editing and reproduction of all reports should be centralized to insure
accuracy as well as speed. Early in 1943, D. R. Inglis of Johns Hopkins
University was appointed Project Editor. All reports of completed work
(known as documents) or of work in progress (known as manuscripts) which
were to be reproduced in any form went through the office of Inglis. The
reports were checked thoroughly from both a technical and editorial point of
view. An appropriate form of reproduction was then selected, and when fin"
ished
they were routed to the workshop or photostating shop. Through Ii@is f
efforts the Laboratory was assured a series of technically accurate, and editorially
consistent, reports of work completed and in progress.
'i
'
'
HEALTH AND SAFETY
3.87 A Health Group reporting to the Director was part of the Laboratory
administration from the beginning. Throughout the present history
this group was under the supervision of Dr. L. H. Hempelmann.
3.88 Health problems of the Laboratory may be classified as (1) standard
industrial health and safety problems, (2) the definition of health standards
in relation to special hazards, (3) the establishment of safe operating
procedures, and (4) routine monitoring and record keeping. At the beginning
all of these were part of the Health Group !s responsibility with Dr. Hempelrnann
acting as chairman of the Laboratory fs Safety Committee. By April
1944 this committee felt that it had become too unwieldy to handle effectively
the increased safety problems resulting from the rapid growth of the project,
and suggested that the Director accept its resignation and organize a new
committee better qualified to handle the problems. Mitchell, Procurement
Office leader, became head of the new committee whose function was defined
to be supervision of all safety installations, inspections, and
netted with the Technical Area and the outlying sites. This
activities con-
was to include
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m
fire, general safety, and maintainance as well as technical safety. Dr.
6
Hempelmann remained a member of the committee representing the Health
Group. Later the execution of safety policies was taken over by the Safety
Group under a full-time safety engineer (9.37). The establishment of" safe
operating procedures and routine monitoring and record keeping remained
under the Health Group 1s general jurisdiction, but such duties were delegated,
wherever possible, to the operating groups or appropriate subcommittees of
the Safety Committee.
3.89 The central responsibility of the Health Group was the establishment
and dissemination of health standards, specifically, of safe tolerance
levels of exposure to radiation and to radioactive and chemical poisons. k
this and in its general supervisory work, the group was concerned primarily
to protect the health of Laboratory employees. Secondarily, it sought also
to protect the legal interests of employees and of the Contractor. To this
end it kept records of the hazards to which individuals were exposed, the
extent of exposure, accidents, and tests for overexposure. In addition it obtained
and recorded pre-employment medical examinations for all technical
personnel. It made complete examinations, including necessary tests, of all
employees on termination. Ordinary industrial accident records, however,
such as shop injuries, were kept by the Post Hospital.
3.90 In the original plan of Laboratory activities it was assumed that
biological and physical research reIated to health problems would be entirely
the responsibility of other laboratories within the M2,nhattan District. Re-0
liance on the work of others did not, however, always provide necessary information
at the time it was needed. Research sections were set up as
needed within the Health Group or by its request in other groups. Thus the
development of apparatus needed for monitoring was undertaken at Los Alamos
in the spring of 1944, and a large share of the instruments were built in the
Electronics Group. Again, in August 1944 it became necessary to investigate
biological methods of testing for overexposure to radioactive poisons, and this
work was undertaken by a section of the Health Group (9.30).
3.91 During its first year the work of the Health Group was relatively
uncomplicated. A semi-research problem which appeared almost immediately
was to discover the extent of variation in normal blood counts. It was discovered
that variations which were at first thought symptomatic of overexposure
to radiation were, in fact, common in normal blood.
3.92 Operation in this period was confined largely to the hazards of
external radiation from accelerating equipment and radioactive sources. The ,
danger of heavy-metal poisoning from uranium had to be guarded against, as "' *
did other chemical hazards, but these problems were not serious.
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-.
.
3.93 The really serious problems of the Health Group appeared in the
early spring of 1944, with the arrival at Los Alamos of the first quantities
of plutonium. The nature of these problems is suggested by the following
brief account of the toxicology of plutonium.
3.94 The metabolism of plutonium is similar to that of radium in that
it is deposited in the bone where its alpha radiation may cause bone sarcoma.
But while radium is deposited with calcium in the living bone, plutonium is
deposited in the surface membranes of the bone, and is presumably not overlaid
by subsequent calcium deposition. Among other body organs the heaviest
deposition occurs in the kidneys, where in sufficient quantities its radiation
causes destruction of tissues responsible for kidney function. This effect,
however, will not become serious except for dosages considerably greater
than those needed (over a sufficient period) to cause bone injury. Another
unfavorable circumstance in the comparison of plutonium with radium is the
much slower rate of elimination from the body in the case of plutonium. In
compensation for these bad qualities, plutonium has a much lower alpha activity
than radium, and is less easily absorbed from the digestive tract. In
general, the problems of handling plutonium are comparable with those of
handling radium, with the allowances for the vastly larger quantity of the
former material that is processed, and for the fact that empirical information
on the toxic effects of small amounts over a 10-or 20-year period is
not available.
3.95 Although not all this information was available at the time, the
general similarity with the radium hazard kid just been discovered; as a
result Hempelmann and representatives from Chicago and Oak Ridge visited
a luminous paint company in Boston to learn how the radium hazard was
handled in that industry. On his return three committees were established
in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Division to develop methods for control of
the plutonium hazard. An instrumentation committee was appointed to design
counters suitable for measuring the radioactive contamination of laboratories
and personnel. A second committee was responsible for the design of apparatus
and equipment for handling plutonium. Apparatus was designed by
this committee in consultation with the chemists concerned, and was built
or procured by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Service Group. A third committee
drew up rules and recommendations for the safe handling of radioactive
materials. The procedures recommended were put into effect in
March 1944, with the understanding that willful noncooperation would result
in immediate dismissal from the Laboratory. A section of the Service Group
was established under W. H. Popham to enforce these procedures. It had the
positive functions of providing personnel with proper protective equipment,
laundering this equipment, monitoring the laboratories and decontaminating
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a
them when necessary, and of keeping complete records. The group worked
very closely with the Health Group.
3.96 In addition to organizing the safety measures described above,
the Health Group carried on an extensive educational campaign among the
groups working with plutonium. Lectures were given on the toxicology of
plutonium, and numerous conferences were held with operating groups to
work out the application of general recommendations. The Health Safety
Handbook was given new members of the Division.
3.97 Despite these precautions the members of the Health Group and
of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Division were not satisfied with the progress
of biological studies on plutonium made by the other projects responsible for
this work. This dissatisfaction was crystallized by an accident which occurred
in August 1944, when by a minor chemical explosion a number of
milligrams of plutonium were thrown in the face of one of the chemists. A
research program was undertaken, aimed primarily at developing tests for
detecting overdosage of plutonium (9.30).
3.98 Another continuing difficulty was the lack of adequate monitoring
equipment. Alpha ray counters lacked either sensitivity or portabili&, and
were not received in adequate numbers. The lack of sensitive portable
meters made it necessary to wipe surfaces suspected of contamination with
oiled filter paper and to measure the activity collected with stationary counters.
Contamination of hands and nostrils was measured in the same fashion.
Because instruments received from Chicago did not meet the local monitoring
requirements, development of such equipment was begun in the Electronics
Group of the Physics Division in May 1944 (9.31).
3.99 One further activity of the Health Group in this period was the
control of the danger of poisoning in the work of high explosive casting.
Standard protective measures were put into effect, and no serious trouble
was encountered in the period covered by the present history. The medical
group performed monthly examinations of all exposed personnel and gave
periodic lectures as to the dangers of toxic effects from high explosive work.
The education of the workers was aided by the fact that all of the plant supervisors
were seasoned in this type of work. The number of cases of TNT
dermatitis was in keeping with the number exposed. This is an allergic reaction
which cannot be entirely prevented in any plant operation.
SHOPS
3.100 The principal shop facilities of the Laboratory were machine
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-.
shops, drafting rooms, a glass shop, and photographic shops. Although for
the most part these were service groups of a standard type, it was true at
least of the machine shops that they encountered a number of administrative
and technical problems of an unusual kind. Although the machine shops did
not become part of the Administrative Division until after the general reorganization
in September 1944, they are discussed in this chapter because
their problems were related and can be more logically treated here than
under the separate Divisions in which they were organized at first.
3.101 In the original program of the Laboratory, plans were made for
a drafting room and machine shop (known as V shop), for the design and
fabrication of laboratory tools and instruments, primarily to serve the Experimental
Physics and Chemistry-Metallurgy Divisions. The glass shop
was an adjunct of the Chemistry groups. Two photographic shops were added
during 1943, one mainly for routine recording and duplication, the other as
an adjunct of the ordnance research program, responsible for technical photography
and a considerable program of optical research (15.48).
3.102 After the beginning of the ordnance program, additional plans
were made for an ordnance drafting room and large ordnance machine shop
(later called C shop). A number of small student shops or special shops
were built at various times. The largest of these was the Graphite Shop of
the Miscellaneous Metallurgy Group (8.52).
3.103 Responsibility for organizing the first shops was assumed on an
interim basis by Mack (1.15). The Laboratory was fortunate in obtaining
Gus H. Schultz, from the University of Wisconsin Shops, as foreman of the
Laboratory shop (V shop). Schultz was not only thoroughly familiar with the
requirements of a laboratory shop, but also had a substantial background of
industrial experience.
3.104 The original area of V Shop was 8000 square feet, planned for
30 toolmakers and machinists, representing an expected shop load of about
1500 man-hours per week. This goal was reached in October or November
of 1943, by which time, however, the goal had been set considerably higher.
(See Graph 10.)
3.105 In July 1943 Mack resigned as shop supervisor and set up the
Optics Shop and research group in the Ordnance Division. His place was
taken by E. A. Long, head of cryogenic research in the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Division.
3.106 In March and April of 1944 some rescheduling of shop work became
necessary, because of the rapidly increasing load in V Shop. At that
time about half of the load came from the Chemistry and Metallurgy Division,
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whose requirements were rapidly increasing. This problem was met by
shifting some of the Metallurgy work to C Shop, and in May adding about
500 square feet to V Shop. Introducing a night shift would have been an
alternative, but it was difficult at the time to find machinists willing to
work in the night shift.
3.107 Three examples may be given of outstanding fabrication problems
solved in V Shop. One was the fabrication of beryllium oxide bricks for the
Water Boiler (13.29): the dies were developed in V Shop as well as the technique
of facing the bricks. Another was the development of apparatus and
technique for welding the thin stainless steel envelopes of the Water Boiler.
Another was the machining and grinding of tungsten carbide. lh all cases
the primary responsibility was borne by the operating group, but the actual
development work was done by shop personnel.
3.108 Construction of C Shop was begun in July 1943 and completed
in October. Its area was 8800 square feet, planned for about 40 machinists
and toolmakers, representing a load of about 2000 man-hours per week. Its
foreman was Rex Peters, under the supervision of C. Cline.
3.109 The career of the experimental shop was relatively smooth and
harmonious, while that of the ordnance shop was full of crises. Some of the
reasons for this contrast came from the nature of the work of each. The
experimental shop was organized after a familiar pattern, staffed and supervised
by men with adequate training and experience. C Shop, by contrast,
was designed for a type of work that was not completely anticipated. Both
the equipment and personnel proved inadequate to the demands that arose.
By the time the difficulties were fully appreciated, the rate of growth of the
Laboratory had become so large that it was impossible fully to overcome
the existing lag.
3.I1O h nay 1944 Cline was transferred to the Engineering Group,
and his place was taken by W. M. Brewer. Whereas Cline had relatively
little experience in shop supervision, Brewer was a man with considerable
experience in handling difficult shop situations in Berkeley and Oak Ridge,
who it was thought would be able to represent shop needs and problems in
the councils of the Ordnance Division. Brewer obtained support for the rapid
procurement of needed equipment and made some reorganization of shop procedure.
Despite these efforts the problems of C Shop deepened, and Brewer
left the Laboratory in the middle of August 1944.
3.111 The nature of the C Shop difficulties may be illustrated in three
ways. The first point is that very little of its work was routine production.
Most items were produced singly or in small lots. Every item had to be
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given detailed specifications in the engineering drafting room. This created
an enormous load of work and involved close cooperation between detaile rs
and the scientists preparing rough drawings. This is a common problem in
laboratory shops, where as a result machinists become very skilled at working
from rough drawings supplemented by informal consultation with users.
h C Shop this was impossible because of its size and because few of the
machinists had the necessary training. The result was more or less constant
complaint about delays in the drafting room and inadequate checking.
3.112 A second symptom of inadequacy was that even a rigid priority
system was insufficient to prevent delays of urgent work. There were constant
small irritations connected with this priority system, in deciding for
example between two such unrelated programs as the gun and the implosion.
3.113 Lack of experience with peculiar fabrication problems added to
the difficulties. As one example, the machining of hemispheres may be mentioned.
The implosion program called for a large number of hemispheres of
various materials and sizes. A 60-inch lathe was acquired for turning large
hemispheres, which proved useless for this work. Peters finally solved the
problem of producing these hemispheres with a specially rigged boring machine.
Eventually, the lathe was needed for other johs; the point is that none
of Peters ~ immediate superiors knew how this work, which is nonstandard,
should be done.
3.114 As the above illustrations would suggest, the problems of C Shop
had their roots in the more general difficulty of developing an adequate Ordnance
Engineering Group. Although the shop had a competent foreman, he
was not in a position to overcome the general lack of foresight in obtaining
men and equipment. This lack, moreover, was not solely the responsibility
of Peters ~ superiors in the Engineering Group; these were in a poor position
to understand the emerging needs of the ordnance research and development
groups, who in turn were not yet geared to their role as weapon designers
(1.53).
3.115 It is not true, however, that the shop and engineering difficulties
were inseparable. They were connected primarily because of organizational
arrangements. The original plan, by which the C Shop was placed under the
Engineering Group of the Ordnance Division, was plausible in terms of the
contemplated narrow range of the ordnance program. As that program
broadened out to include not only the gun program but also the rapidly expanding
implosion program, such arrangements became less plausible. The
C Shop became in fact a service organization doing work for a number of
semi-independent organizations. Throughout the Laboratory the emphasis of
work began to shift toward development work. The line of division between
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the two big shops became less well defined. In the end, therefore, it became
clear that the proper remedy for shop troubles was to place both C
and V Shops under unified management. This would not only make for
greater flexibility in the division of labor between shops, but would also
give to C Shop the strong leadership needed to overcome its constant difficulties
and to prepare it for the even more difficu~ days ahead. Such a
step, moreover, would simplify the remaining problems of the Engineering
Group, being a step away from the conception of the latter as a key administrative
organization, and toward concentration on the increasingly difficult
problems of design-development, of engineering in the narrow sense.
3.116 At the time of the August 1944 reorganization, accordingly, the
C Shop was moved from the Ordnance Division to the V Shop administration
of Long and Schultz.
CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE
3.117 Some of the construction problems have already been described
in Chapter 1, and in particular the construction situation at the time Laboratory
personnel began to arrive. The procedure used for the construction
of the original buildings was standard for Army installations. Specifications
for the original buildings had been given to the IWmhattan District Engineer Is
Office in New York by Oppenheimer, McMillan, and Manley. Plans were
drawn by the Stone and Webster Corporation of Boston since it was originally
expected that they would do the construction. The drawings were transmitted
to the Albuquerque District Office of the U. S. Engineers, and a contract was
let by this office to the M. M. Sundt Company. On completion of the buildings
the Sundt Company transferred them to the Albuquerque District, which
in turn transferred them to the Santa Fe Area Office of the Manhattan District
Engineers, in theory the ltising service. ~' The actual using service,
the technical staff, had no official position in this process, and since during
the critical period of actual construction they were still scattered about the
country, liaison was totally inadequate. The Albuquerque District remained
in formal charge of construction until early 1944, at which time the Manhattan
District assumed complete responsibility.
3.118 By May 1943, the original buildings had been occupied and were
in process of being expanded. The Sundt Company had undertaken two relatively
large structures: a new warehouse and an addition to the cyclotron
laboratory, but was not going to be able to complete the necessary work in
time. Ordinarily the Army was responsible for providing additional
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construction workers, but in this early period was not able to do so, and
the Contractor (University of California) had employed a number of carpenters,
plumbers, electricians, and laborers. Under contract regulations, these
workers could not be employed for any permanent construction, but only for
maintenance work and the construction of shacks and "lean-to' s." These
men at first worked under the direction of members of the scientific staff,
and later under Brazier who was employed by the Technical Area as supervisor
of construction and maintenance. Brazier !s responsibilities were not
altogether well-defined at any time, but it can be said that he was responsible
for the preliminary design of the major expansion program which began in
June and which included a new office building, offices and laboratories for
the ordnance program, and a heavy machine shop. Brazier's staff grew
from about a dozen men in May to 264 in January 1944, when he left the site.
3.119 General Groves had wanted for some time to have all construction
handled by the Army Engineers, and his final decision in this matter
was hastened by a series of complaints made by the War Manpower Commission,
the United States Employment Service, and the American Federation
of Labor, that there were certain irregularities in the project 1s procedure
of employing construction workers. In January 1944, Brazier's entire staff
was turned over to the Army payroll with the exception of three foremen
who remained on the University of California payroll. The scientific staff
saw considerable advantage both from the point of view of security and that
of efficiency in having a separate construction and maintenance group for the
Technical Area. Although it was not found possible to keep the entire group
on the Universi& of California payroll, the three key men, Charlie Stallings,
Melvin Foley, and Dan Pfaff -in charge, respectively, of carpenters, plumbers,
and electricians -were kept, and their assistants assigned permanently to
the Technical Area. The group, under the direction of John Williams, was
responsible for the maintenance, repair, and installation of all scientific
equipment or machine tools under the jurisdiction of technical personnel, and
also for building and remodeling apparatus and equipment of a scientific
nature.
3.120 The construction and maintenance group under the jurisdiction
of the Army Engineers was responsible for all alterations and additions and
repairs to buildings, including services and installations, and for the installation
of new, and repair of existing, utilities. The Army also found it neces
sary to establish separate organizations for the maintenance and construction
of the Technical Area and outlying sites and for the post, housing, and
administrative areas. Separate priority lists were maintained for both groups
in accordance with urgency ratings assigned by those requesting service.
3.121 Nearly all major new construction was handled by contractors
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under the supervision of the Post Operations Division. The original contractors,
M. M. Sundt Company, remained in charge until the end of 1943.
They were succeeded by the J. E. Morgan Company which built a section of
the housing area during the first three months of 1944. They in turn were
succeeded by R. E. McKee who remained in charge of construction with an
average force of between 700 and 1.000 men. The architect, W. C. Kruger,
whose contract was originally issued by the Albuquerque District, was retained
by the Manhattan District throughout the life of the project. (See
Graph 8 for rate of growth of technical construction.)
3.122 Requests for all but the most minor construction had to be made
by group leaders or their superiors, and urgency ratings assigned in the
same way as those for orders on the Procurement Division. Such requests
were submitted to the office of David Dow who acted as liaison between the
using groups and the Post Operations Division. Frequent conferences were
held to determine priorities and set up tentative completion schedules. One
of the most frequent causes of difficulty between the using groups and the
construction services was the inability of the former to foresee their needs
very far in advance, since construction depended in many cases upon the results
of experiments in progress.
PATENT OFFICE
3.123 In accordance with procedure outlined by the Office of Scientific
Research and Development for the protection of Government interests in scientific
research, the Contractor was required to l!report the progress of all
studies and investigations undertaken, disclose to the Government all inventions
made in carrying out the work of the contract, and furnish a complete
final report of findings and conclusions. u Here again security was an important
factor in determining administrative organization. Since few Contractor
~s representatives were permitted to visit the Laboratory or to know
much about the technical details of the work being done here (3.17), they
could not make the necessary reports for patent purposes. Consequently,
the University turned over much of its responsibility for protecting Government
interests to Major Ralph Carlisle Smith, the Patent Officer, who arrived
in July 1943 to establish the Patent Office.
3.124 The work of the Patent Office was conditioned in many ways by
considerations of security. The most serious effect was the limitation of
personnel of this office to the absolute minimum. Since it was the duty of
the Patent Division to report the progress of all the scientific work done on
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the project, and since this was the only office where all of this information
would necessarily be compiled in language understandable to an individual
having a general scientific background, the Director and the Security Officer
felt that only a few absolutely trustworthy individuals could be permitted to
work here even in a clerical capacity, For some time Major Smith had no
assistants at all, but eventually he obtained among the enlisted men and
women already employed on the project a minimum staff which had to be
trained on the job. Only after a year and a half was he able to secure two
legally trained, scientific assistants.
3.125 In addition to limiting the staff of the Patent Office, security
considerations increased its burden to include responsibility for all patent
matters affecting subcontractors or involving project employees who had
come here from other projects. Thus, the Patent Office assumed responsibility
for the early subprojects such as those at Purdue Universi@ and Stanford
University (1.4), as well as for the later subcontractors, such as F.
Flader and the California Institute of Technology (9.15). Furthermore, employees
who had transferred here from other government projects were not
permitted to communicate directly with their previous colleagues in the patent
field, and therefore any unfinished patent matters had to be transferred to
this project for completion.
3.126 The Patent Office established the methods and procedure of recording
work done and secured the cooperation of the technical staff in keeping
the necessary records. Numbered notebooks were issued, originally by
the Patent Office and later by the Library document room, and in these staff
members currently recorded the details of experiments and the exact dates
of the various stages of development of inventions and discoveries made.
Completed notebooks and those turned in by people leaving the project were
kept on file by the Library document room. Through the Business Manager ~s
Office, patent agreements were secured from every employee, subcontractor,
and consultant of the University of California. The Patent Office obtained
special patent agreements from military personnel and civilian employees of
the War and Navy Departments, and special patent contracts from individuals
on loan directly to the Manhattan District from other employers. Employees
of foreign governments were not required to sign agreements, but did prepare
records of inventions and executed U. S. applications to the benefit of the
U. S, Government. Monthly reports of the activities of foreign personnel
were prepared by the Patent Division. These and similar reports of visits
by consultants and foreign personnel were sent to General Groves t office.
All terminating personnel were required to appear before the Patent Officer
and assert that they had made no inventions without recording them with the
Patent Office, and they had turned in all original records to the document
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room, or other appropriate depository.
3.127 The most important duty of the Patent Office was, of course,
that of preparing patent applications to protect the Government and to prevent
outside interests from later dominating the pertinent fields of research
and development. Circumstances at this project made it necessary for
llaj or Smith and his staff to be not only experienced patent attorneys, but
also expert in a variety of technical subjects. Experiments covered much more
than nuclear physics; they included chemistry, metallurgy, ordnance, and
explosives and electronics, to mention only the largest fields. Patent cases
submitted can be classified into five prinoipal groups: the production, chemistry,
and metallurgy of fissionable materials; isotope separation; power reactors;
electronic equipment; and the bomb itself with its various developments
and improvements. Altogether there were about 500 patent cases reported
to Washington OSRD Headquarters covering work done at this Laboratory,
and about 300 handled in connection with work done on other projects.
Of these, a substantial number have been filed in the U. S. Patent Office.
3.128 Because of the pressure of time and the very limited staff of
the Patent Office, it was not possible to write cases in the usual manner.
Ordinarily an inventor or research scientist prepares invention reports of
things he considers new and useful and submits these to a patent attorney
for approval and the preparation of a formal application. Here the members
of the Patent Office read the daily records and other reports of research
workers, inspected the laboratories and test sites, held periodic discussions
of work accomplished with various individuals, and attended seminars and
conferences of the various groups and divisions. In all of these sources, the
Patent Office found ideas and practices that were new and useful, prepared
the applications so as to give maximum scope to the inventions in their relation
to the entire project and associated f}elds, and submitted these applications
to the inventors for final approval. Since members of the technical
staff were pressed for time and, in any event, were reluctant to take time
from research for preparing reports, this rather unorthodox procedure proved
to be extremely helpful. An additional complicating factor in the work of
preparing cases was the fact that by reason of the nature of the work, a
great many developments had to be covered before there was any physical
embodiment proving that the inventions were workable -before any l?actual
reduction to practice, " in legal jargon. The test shot at Trinity was the first
reduction to practice for many inventions, the success of which was long before
anticipated by the completion and filing of a series of patent applications.
Completed cases were transmitted by Army courier to the OSRD Washington
Patent Headquarters, headed by Captain R. A. Lavender, USN, and filed with
the U. S. Patent Office.
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